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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to review and add to approximately fifty
years of research on New Zealand listed companies from various disciplines. The
main findings are not controversial, as corporate governance standards are high by
international standards. To be sure, there has been a rolling set of corporate
failures in the finance company sector since the global financial crisis-
principally involving nonlisted finance companies issuing debt securities to the
public-but these failures have been comprehensively addressed by recent
legislative reforms. In this regard, the article will be of interest to corporate
governance researchers seeking a topical review of corporate governance in a
small, common law jurisdiction. A key commercial context, however, is supplied
by the regional free trade agreement between New Zealand and Australia, the
recent free trade agreement between Australia and the United States, and the
(largely moot) free-trade agreement between New Zealand and the United States.
In the event that New Zealand and the United States do enter into a free-trade
agreement, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. corporations contemplating
investment in New Zealand will take a much closer interest in corporate
governance in New Zealand as part of their legal risk assessments.
As stated, this article comprehensively reviews and adds to extant
research on corporate governance of New Zealand listed companies.' It is cross-
disciplinary in nature and considers legal, managerial, and accounting
perspectives, as well as literature on corporate governance. Part I of the article
provides background information on listed companies in New Zealand and
outlines some of the key legal issues relevant to such companies. Part II considers
corporate control of New Zealand listed companies. Part III reviews interlocking
directorships, while Part IV considers overall board composition including board
size, independent directors, board leadership, and diversity on boards. Part V
discusses board committees (including audit, remuneration, and nomination
committees), and Part VI concludes our review. While the aim of this article is to
provide a topical resource on corporate governance in New Zealand listed
companies, we also think the article provides some commercial intelligence for
U.S. corporations contemplating investment in New Zealand, a matter which will
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come into closer focus if the proposed free-trade agreement between New Zealand
and the United States proceeds.2
A. "Listed" and "Unlisted" Companies
Generally speaking, there are only two significant types of companies
limited by shares in New Zealand: "listed" and "unlisted" companies. When we
refer to "listed companies," we mean companies listed on the New Zealand Stock
Exchange (NZSX), the most viable board for equity securities of the New Zealand
Exchange Limited (NZX). Unlisted companies are companies that are not listed
on any registered exchange in New Zealand. Corporate governance matters for all
types of companies, but it is most important where a company raises money from
the public. In New Zealand, this activity is predominantly carried out by
companies listed on the markets operated by the NZX. Unlisted companies are
also able to raise money from the public in New Zealand and, as this article will
discuss, the corporate governance regime that applies to some of these companies
is problematic.
We focus on corporate governance in listed companies that raise money
from the public for two related reasons. The first and overarching reason is that
2. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Singapore in 2009,
President Obama announced that a free trade deal with New Zealand would go ahead. On
the Closer Economic Relations Agreement between Australia and New Zealand, see
Gordon Walker, The CER Agreement and Trans-Tasman Securities Regulation: Part 1, 19
J. INT'L. BANK. L. & REG. 390 (2004). See also ALAN BENNETT, GUIDE TO THE AUSTRALIA-
UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (2005). Inward investment into New Zealand is
governed by the Overseas Investment Act 2005 (NZ) and the Overseas Investment
Regulations 2005 (NZ). Partly as a result of the CER Agreement, downstream agreements
such as the Memorandum of Understanding on Business Law Co-ordination Between
Australia and New Zealand and the mutual recognition of securities offerings regime
between Australia and New Zealand, Australia is the principal influence on the corporate
governance of New Zealand listed companies (via the Australian Stock Exchange Listing
Rules). On the mutual recognition of securities offerings regime, see Press Release, Lianne
Dalziel, World First in Comprehensive Mutual Recognition of Securities Offerings, June
13, 2008), available at http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/world-first-comprehensive-
mutual-recognition-securities-offerings.
3. The NZX operates three markets: the NZSX, the New Zealand Debt Market
(NZDX), and the New Zealand Alternative Market (NZAX). Before demutualization, the
NZX was known as the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE). The demutualization of the
NZSE is discussed in Gordon Walker, New Zealand, in 3 INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION: PACIFIC RIM (Gordon Walker ed., 2011). Until May 2011, the Securities
Commission was the chief co-regulator of listed companies. In May 2011, the Securities
Commission was disestablished and its role taken over by the Financial Markets Authority.
4. For an overview of the issues, see VICTORIA STACE, SECURITIES LAW IN NEW
ZEALAND ch. 30 (2010).
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good corporate governance supports investor protection. Indeed, investor
protection and the prevention of fraud are the historical reasons for prospectus
disclosure. The second reason is a modem restatement of the first reason, with the
emphasis on protection of minority shareholders. This reason is best framed as a
question: how do the outside investors get a return on their investment and their
money back? 6
Because of the so-called "agency problem," corporate-governance issues
always assume importance where there is a significant separation of ownership
and control.' Such separation occurs in listed companies in New Zealand. By
contrast, corporate governance issues are of little or no importance to a single-
shareholder/single-director company, where the director is the sole shareholder
and there is no fundraising from the public. According to the New Zealand
Companies Office database, the overwhelming majority (over 95%) of all New
Zealand registered companies are small or medium-sized enterprises. If there is
any separation of ownership and control in such companies, minority shareholders
typically have the ability to stipulate the terms upon which they will become
shareholders and invest capital. Hence, incoming minority shareholders can
negotiate amendments to the company's constitution and shareholders' agreement
if they so desire. This process is called "private ordering." 9 Following this logic,
we assume that listed companies face the biggest challenges with respect to
corporate governance.
The assumption that listed companies matter most for corporate
governance issues generally holds quite well. Where this assumption does not
hold up so well is when a majority-controlled unlisted company in New Zealand is
5. Governance mechanisms also influence the finance policies of public listed
companies (i.e., decisions about reliance on debt versus equity). A study of New Zealand
firms from 2004 to 2008 demonstrates that those listed firms with weak governance
mechanisms tend to be more reliant on leverage than firms with strong governance
mechanisms. See Hardjo Koerniadi & Alireza Tourani Rad, Corporate Governance,
Financing Patterns and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from New Zealand Companies 1
(2012 Fin. Mkts. & Corporate Governance Conference Paper, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1969584.
6. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 738 (1997) (expressing this article's view of corporate governance from a
straightforward agency perspective, with the key question being: "We want to know how
investors get the managers to give them back their money."). For a literature review of this
line of research up to 2002, see Gordon Walker, Corporate Governance in East Asia:
Prospects for Reform, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN AsIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE 575-77
(Low Chee Keong ed., 2002).
7. On the agency problem, see MICHAEL JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM 85-87
(2003).
8. See GORDON WALKER ET AL., COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS OF COMPANY LAW IN
NEw ZEALAND 7 (4th ed. 2012).
9. See generally Harm-Jan de Kluiver, Private Ordering and Buy-Out Remedies
Within Private Company Law: Towards a New Balance Between Fairness and Welfare? 8
EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 103 (2007).
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an "issuer."10 An issuer may be an unlisted company that has allotted securities
pursuant to an offer that requires the issuance of some type of disclosure
document as specified in the Securities Act 1978 or the Securities Regulations
2009.11 As it turns out, majority-controlled, unlisted issuers of debt securities are
the key corporate governance problem in New Zealand.12 The raft of finance
company failures in New Zealand during the global financial crisis provides
evidence for this proposition.1 Unlisted finance companies raised money from
10. See JOSEPH HEALY, NEW ZEALAND CAPITAL MARKETS 4 (2001), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20100522013822/http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/1 8163/healy.
pdf (noting that "[w]hen large shareholders effectively control firms, their policies may
result in the expropriation of minority shareholders and reduced managerial initiative"); see
also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 6, at 759 (arguing that "as ownership gets beyond a
certain point, the large owners gain nearly full control and are wealthy enough to prefer to
use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority share-
holders. Thus there are costs associated with high ownership and entrenchment, as well as
with exceptionally dispersed ownership.").
11. Securities Act 1978 cl 33(1); see also Securities Regulations, SR 2009/230, reg
5(1).
12. Mark Peart, Finance Company Collapses - A Sign of Poor Corporate
Governance? DIRECTOR, Apr. 2008, at 71.
13. See STACE, supra note 4; COMMERCE COMM., H.R., 49th Parl., INQUIRY INTO
FINANCE COMPANY FAILURES (2011) (NZ) [hereinafter COMPANY FAILURES INQUIRY],
available at http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/57E84344-829E-45EB-9F99-EIF8E3
8DF2C1/204528/DBSCHSCR 5335 Inquiryintofinancecompanyfailuresll.pdf; see also
COMMERCE COMM., 2007/08 FINANCIAL REVIEW OF THE MINISTRY OF EcoNoMIc
DEVELOPMENT (2009) (NZ) [hereinafter FINANCIAL REVIEW], available at
http://www.parliament.nz/Nk/rdonlyres/16F22058-8DD8-4541-B9A9-064848076239/
100892/DBSCHSCR 4272_6521.pdf; COMMERCE COMM., BRIEFING ON FINANCE
COMPANY FAILURES (2009) (NZ) [hereinafter COMPANY FAILURES BRIEFING], available at
http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/88FE4F52-55C3-42CO-8451-81EFE5CF2DEB/
113426/DBSCHSCR 4483 Briefingonfinancecompanyfailures 69.pdf; Sophie Gladwell
& Dilmun Leach, Corporate Governance in the Credit Crisis, NZLAWYER, July 10, 2009,
at 22; Darise Bennington, Honest Bridgecorp Directors Prohibition Upheld by High Court,
NZLAWYER, Sept. 17, 2010, at 1; Maria Collet-Beavan, A Brand New Regime, NZLAWYER,
Oct. 15, 2010, at 13; James Weir, We Stood Back and Did Nothing, SOUTHLAND TIMES
(New Zealand), Nov. 26, 2010, at 18; Press Release, N.Z. Sec. Comm'n, Commission
Releases Information on Finance Company Investigations (Dec. 3, 2010); W. Wilson et al.,
Best Practice Corporate Governance? The Failure of Bridgecorp (Fin. & Corporate
Governance Conference Paper, Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1714663. Failures of corporate governance played a role in
the global financial crisis. A National Commission set up to investigate the financial crisis
in the USA commented, "The Commission concludes that some large investment banks,
bank holding companies, and insurance companies, including Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and
AIG, experienced massive losses related to the subprime mortgage market because of
significant failures of corporate governance, including risk management. Executive and
employee compensation systems at these institutions disproportionally rewarded short-term
risk taking. The regulators (the former Securities and Exchange Commission for the large
investment banks and the banking supervisors for the bank holding companies and AIG)
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the public by way of debt securities, but these companies were not subject to the
discipline of the New Zealand Exchange Listing Rules. In particular, such issuers
were not subject to the continuous disclosure regime that applies to listed
companies. 14 The inapplicability of the Listing Rules, combined with significant
weaknesses in the Companies Act 1993 (for example, weak related-party
transaction rules) and the securities regulation regime (as far as unlisted issuers of
debt securities were concerned), are among the reasons for the failures of finance
companies in recent years.
B. Workin2 Assumptions and Some Initial Observations About Corporate
Governance in New Zealand
We now state some generalized working assumptions. We agree with
writers such as Susan Watson and Chris Noonan that corporate governance in
New Zealand has a statutory base. 16 John Farrar's taxonomy of matters affecting
corporate governance also includes "hard soft law," such as stock exchange listing
rules and statements of accounting practice.17 Again, we agree, but go no further.
In particular, we do not think that unlisted companies take voluntary codes of
conduct, such as the former Securities Commission's Principles and Guidelines,
seriously because the companies are not legally compelled to observe them, and
there is little evidence they do so voluntarily.' 8
failed to adequately supervise their safety and soundness, allowing them to take inordinate
risk in activities such as nonprime mortgage securitization and over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives dealing and to hold inadequate capital and liquidity." See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 279 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
14. The problem was partially addressed in the Securities Amendment Regulations
2007.
15. See William R. Wilson et al., Examination of NZ Finance Company Failures:
The Role of Corporate Governance (Fin. & Corporate Governance Conference Paper, Jan.
14, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1536874. For an analysis of the role
related party transactions played in the finance company collapses, see Duncan C. Jessep et
al., Related Party Transactions in New Zealand: An Empirical Study of a Flawed System,
30 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 110 (2012).
16. Susan Watson & Chris Noonan, The Foundations of Corporate Governance in
New Zealand: A Post-Contractualist View of the Role of Company Directors, 22 N.Z. U. L.
REV. 649 (2007).
17. JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 4
(3d ed. 2008).
18. SEC. COMM'N OF N.Z., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND: PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES (2004), available at http://www.fma.govt.nz/media/178375/corporate-
governance-handbook.pdf The Principles are reviewed in COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW
IN NEW ZEALAND ch. 10 (John Farrar ed., 2008). Generally speaking, unlisted finance
company issuers did not observe these principles and guidelines during the global financial
crisis. See STACE, supra note 4.
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We view corporate governance as having particular meaning and
application for listed companies because of the contractual obligations contained
in the relevant NZSX Listing Rules. These obligations can be regarded as default
investor protection rules. They are necessary because an investor in a listed
company generally does not have the ability to customise the terms upon which he
or she invests because the investment occurs on the secondary market. By
contrast, shareholders in unlisted companies have the ability to customize their
company constitutions and negotiate such corporate governance rules as they see
fit as a condition of their shareholding (private ordering). 9
We also think that listed companies would not undertake many or all of
the corporate governance practices demanded by legislation or by the NZSX
Listing Rules were they not legally obliged to do so.20 So, for example, while
there is some evidence to support the proposition that good governance translates
to superior share price performance, 21 we do not think enlightened corporate self-
interest is the key driver of corporate governance practices. Rather, we contend it
is the coercive nature of various mandatory and "voluntary" disclosure
requirements imposed on listed companies-the legal infrastructure of corporate
governance that drives these practices. 22 These requirements represent the modern
formulation of a policy of disclosure by companies first articulated in 1844 in the
23Gladstone Committee Report. Thus, the legal implementation of corporate
governance is largely concerned with two types of coercive information
disclosure: mandatory and "voluntary" disclosures.
In New Zealand, all companies must comply with certain mandatory
rules contained in the Companies Act 1993 and related legislation, such as the
Financial Reporting Act 1993. An additional set of mandatory requirements is
imposed on listed companies by the Listing Rules. The Listing Rules include so-
called "voluntary" rules that require listed companies to "comply or explain" the
extent to which they have complied with the NZX Corporate Governance Best
19. WALKER ET AL., supra note 8.
20. FARRAR, supra note 17. See also Trish Keeper, Codes of Ethics and Corporate
Governance: A Study of New Zealand Listed Companies (Oct. 20, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 947113.
21. Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. EcoN.
107 (2003). For a recent Australian study, see Wealth, AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 31, 2010, at 5 (a
study by Goldman Sachs JBWere found that companies that scored highly on governance
issues produced a 35% excess return on the index). Another study found that the
governance-return correlation existed from 1991 to 1999, but was not evident from 2000 to
2008. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Learning and the Disappearing Association Between
Governance and Returns (Harvard Law & Discussion Paper No. 667, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589731.
22. This is an argument for the primacy of legal rules (or legal coercion) in corporate
governance. It implies that some of the management literature extolling the virtues of good
corporate governance is making a virtue of legal necessity.
23. For a discussion of the Gladstone Report, see Gordon Walker, Securities
Regulation, Efficient Markets and Behavioural Finance, 36 HONG KONG L.J. 481, 488
(2006).
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Practice Code that appears in an appendix to the NZSX Listing Rules. 24 To this
extent, New Zealand takes a hybrid approach to the corporate governance of listed
companies with a mixture of mandatory and voluntary rules. The reasoning
underpinning this approach is that the market will make a judgement about the
quality of the disclosures, and this will be reflected in the company's share price.
Such logic assumes companies are not indifferent to the impact of their disclosure
practices on share prices. In normal times, this assumption seems reasonable for
the blue chip end of the market; however, it is doubtful whether this assumption is
valid for all companies in the market.25
Generally speaking, New Zealand listed companies do not suffer from
the concerns that are the typical subjects of criticism by those promoting good
corporate governance.26 For example, corporate ownership is relatively
concentrated in New Zealand, rather than diffuse (thereby reducing opportunities
and incentives for self-serving behaviour by managers at the expense of
shareholders). Also, boards are typically of a reasonable size, are led by an
independent chairperson, and tend to have independent directors. Finally,
interlocking boards (i.e., directors serving on multiple boards) tend to be rare. A
major criticism of the boards of New Zealand companies, however, is that their
composition is not diverse. Rather, they are "relatively homogenous in terms of
gender, age, ethnicity, and functional diversity." 27
Several studies have contrasted governance systems around the world.
Vidhi Chhaochharia and Luc Laeven reviewed governance norms and practices in
twenty-three countries. Using data from the Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS) Global Corporate Governance Database, these authors created a governance
index based on seventeen governance variables. New Zealand was rated as
having the best governance system from 2003 to 2005.28 Chhaochharia and
Laeven also found, across their entire sample, "a modest though not insignificant
effect" of governance scores on financial performance and that governance
24. NZX, LTD., NZSX/NZDX LISTING RULES, r. 10.5.5(h)-(i) (2010) [hereinafter
NZSX LISTING RULES], available at https://www.nzx.com/files/static/
NZSX NZDXListingRules.pdf. See generally Diane K. Denis & John J. McConnell,
International Corporate Governance (ECGI - Fin. Working Paper No. 05, 2003), available
at http://www.ssm.com/abstract=320121.
25. See Damian Reichel, Continuous Disclosure in Volatile Times, 28 COMPANY &
SEC. L.J. 84 (2010); Gill North, Continuous Disclosure in Australia: The Empirical
Uncertainties, 28 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 394 (2011).
26. In September 2010, New Zealand was ranked fifth in the world for corporate
governance according to GovernanceMetrics International. See Proxy Power Questioned,
AUSTL. FIN. REv., Jan. 19, 2011, at 9.
27. N. van der Walt et at., Board Configuration: Are Diverse Boards Better Boards?,
6 CoRP. GOVERNANCE 129, 142 (2006); see also N. van der Walt et al., Corporate
Government Diversity - Does it Make a Better Board?, N.Z. MGMT., Nov. 2004, at 80.
28. Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, Corporate Governance Norms and
Practices, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 405 (2009) (this conclusion is based on relatively few
firms (12 in 2003, 13 in 2004, and 18 in 2005)).
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systems that go beyond the norms of their countries' systems have a strong,
positive impact on firm value.29
The 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Report ranked New Zealand
highly in terms of governance practices. 30 New Zealand ranked eighth out of 139
countries on the "efficacy of corporate boards," with a score of 5.5 out of 7.
New Zealand also scored highly on the strength of financial and auditing
standards (6.2 out of 7; third overall). For protection of minority interests, New
Zealand received a 5.6 out of 7 (the fifth highest ranking of all countries). For
strength of investor protection, New Zealand scored highest at 9.7 out of 10.
Overall, the Global Competitiveness Report concludes that New Zealand:
[P]ossesses some of the best-functioning institutions in the
world, ranking 3rd, behind only Singapore and Hong Kong in
this pillar. Specifically, it ranks 4th for the quality of public
institutions while it retains its leadership in the private
institutions component. Overall, the environment is extremely
conducive to business, supported by efficient goods (7th) and
labour markets (12th) and by one of the soundest banking
systems in the world (2nd). 32
Corporate governance research in New Zealand has been relatively
sparse.33 This is largely due to the small size of the listed corporate sector (with
29. Id. at 414.
30. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, 2010-2011 (K.
Schwab ed., 2010) available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF
GlobalCompetitivenessReport_20 10-1l .pdf. See also Peter Cornelius, Good Corporate
Practices in Poor Corporate Governance Systems, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE 12 (2005).
31. A rating of "7" would have indicated that "investors and boards exert strong
supervision of management decisions." See WORLD EcoN. FORUM, supra note 30, at 384.
32. Id. at 29. However, a study carried out by Morningstar measuring the
experiences of mutual fund investors in twenty-two countries scored New Zealand at "D-,"
the worst. See BENJAMIN N. ALPERT & JOHN REKENTHALER, MORNINGSTAR, MORNINGSTAR
GLOBAL FUND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE 2011, at 31 (2011), available at
http://corporate.momingstar.com/us/documents/ResearchPapers/GlobalFundlnvestorExperi
ence201l.pdf.
33. For a discussion of the characteristics of the New Zealand market, including its
small size, openness, and remoteness, see Michal S. Gal, The Effects of Smallness and
Remoteness on Competition Law - The Case of New Zealand, 14 COMPETITION &
CONSUMER L.J. 292 (2007); Terence Arnold et al., The Structure of New Zealand Industry
and Its Implications for Competition Law, in NEW ZEALAND COMPETITION LAW AT THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY 24-60 (Mark Berry & Lewis Evans eds., 2003); GRAHAM T.
CROCOMBE ET AL., UPGRADING NEW ZEALAND'S COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1991). For
discussion on New Zealand capital markets, see CAPITAL MARKET DEV. TASKFORCE,
MINISTRY OF EcoN. DEV., CAPITAL MARKETS MATTER: REPORT OF THE CAPITAL MARKET
DEV. TASKFORCE (2009) [hereinafter CAPITAL MARKETS MATTER], available at
http://www.med.govt.nz/business/economic-development/pdf-docs-library/cmd-capital-
markets-matter-full-report.pdf.
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fewer than 160 companies listed on the main board in early 2011), the relatively
small international impact and profile of these companies, and the small size of
the academic sector in New Zealand. Some earlier attempts at literature reviews
occurred in the mid-1990s and focused mainly on issues of governance and
securities regulation.34 Nonetheless, research on governance in New Zealand has
increased substantially over the last fifteen years or so. Most notably, we have
seen increasing interest from scholars in the fields of accounting, economics,
finance, management, and sociology.
In this article, we review and add to around fifty years of studies on the
corporate governance of New Zealand listed companies. We investigate who
(generally) controls listed companies and ask how common directorship linkages
are between listed entities. We then turn our attention to the characteristics of
boards themselves, before focusing on board committees. This article concludes
by returning to issues associated with the failure of nonbank financial
intermediaries in recent years. While much of the focus of this article is on legal
and regulatory issues relating to corporate governance, the nature of the literature
we draw upon means that our discussion is informed by interdisciplinary research.
II. CORPORATE CONTROL
Corporate governance in New Zealand largely comprises the mandatory
reporting requirements contained in the Companies Act 1993, cognate legislation,
and the NZSX Listing Rules, including the voluntary "comply or explain" rule.35
The NZSX Listing Rules contain a Corporate Governance Best Practice Code in
Appendix 16 comprising flexible principles. NZSX listed companies are required
by Listing Rule 10.5.5 to "comply or explain" adherence to the Code in a
corporate governance statement in the annual report.36
34. Mark A. Fox & Gordon R. Walker, Sharemarket Ownership and Securities
Regulation in New Zealand, 17 N.Z. U. L. REv. 402 (1997); Mark A. Fox & Gordon R.
Walker, Regulatory Design and Sharemarket Ownership in New Zealand, 3 ADVANCES IN
INT'L BANK. & FIN. 123 (1998); Mark A. Fox & Gordon R. Walker, Evidence on the
Corporate Governance of New Zealand Listed Companies, 8 OTAGO L. REV. 317 (1995);
Mark Fox & Gordon Walker, New Zealand Sharemarket Ownership, in SECURITIES
REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 261-86 (Gordon Walker et al. eds., 2d ed.
1998); Simon Swallow et al., The New Zealand Stock Exchange and Securities Markets in
New Zealand, in SECURITIES REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 214-41
(Gordon Walker et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998). Also, two relatively contemporary books are of
relevance: JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND (3d
ed. 2008); JOSEPH HEALY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND WEALTH CREATION IN NEW
ZEALAND (2003). The Healy book largely ignores the extant research on this very topic.
35. Alma Pekmezovic, Empirical Studies on Corporate Ownership, 2007 N.Z. L.J.
275. (2007). For a recent discussion of the NZSX Listing Rules, see Mark Fox, Gordon
Walker & Alma Pekmezovic, Corporate Governance Disclosures, 2010 N.Z. L.J. 239
(2010).
36. NZSX LISTING RULES, supra note 24, r. 10.5.5.
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In contrast, the U.S. model of governance takes a more prescriptive
approach; for example, Sarbanes-Oxley (a response to various governance
failures) provides a mandatory, rules-based regime.37 Such differences may be (at
least in part) due to underlying differences in the ownership and control of
companies in various countries.38 In the United States (and, for that matter, in the
United Kingdom) corporate ownership tends to be widely dispersed, with majority
shareholders being somewhat rare and markets being relatively liquid. By
contrast, New Zealand has a small, less developed, less liquid securities market
and fewer widely held companies.3 9 Accordingly, there is an argument that
strategic regulatory design should be informed by stock market ownership. 40 For
example, an understanding of ownership composition makes it easier to more
effectively target regulatory funding-something that is particularly critical in
New Zealand, where the budget for securities regulation has been limited.4 1
A. Control Classifications and General Governance Issues
There is now almost fifty years of data on the control of New Zealand
listed companies, with studies dating back to 1962. These studies generally use a
classification scheme devised by Graeme Fogelberg (see Table 1).42 Under that
scheme, at one extreme, majority control represents a situation where there is a
major shareholder (or close-knit group of shareholders) that holds an unassailable
position in the control of a company. At the other extreme, management control
represents a situation where shareholdings are so widely dispersed that no
individual shareholder can exercise control in the direction of a company.
37. See generally Nandini Rajagopalan & Yan Zhang, Recurring Failures in
Corporate Governance: A Global Disease?, 52 Bus. HORIZONs 545 (2009). These authors
propose that violations of governance reforms is a function of perceived costs and benefits
such that "[t]he higher the costs imposed on the perpetrator and the lower the benefits
associated with the fraud, the lower the likelihood that the fraud will be committed." Id. at
549.
38. Alma Pekmezovic, Determinants of Corporate Ownership: The Question of
Legal Origin - Part 1, 18 INT'L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 97 (2007); Alma Pekmezovic,
Determinants of Corporate Ownership: The Question of Legal Origin - Part 2 INT'L
COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 147 (2007).
39. See generally Swallow et al., supra note 34.
40. See generally Fox & Walker, Regulatory Design, supra note 34.
41. These suggestions are similar to those made by Peter Fitzsimons, who, when
commenting on takeover regulation in New Zealand, noted that much debate had
misguidedly focused on "evidence and arguments associated with stock markets in which
shares are widely held." See Peter Fitzsimons, Takeovers and Efficiency in the Context of
Concentrated Shareholdings: The Case of New Zealand, 15 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 4, 4
(1997).
42. Graeme Fogelberg, Ownership and Control in 43 of New Zealand's Largest
Companies, 2 N.Z. J. Bus. 54 (1980).
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Classification schemes such as Fogelberg's are based on the premise that
diffuse ownership may lead managers to engage in self-interested behaviors that
are not in the best interests of shareholders. This creates the so-called "agency
problem," whereby managers (agents) may not always act in the best interests of
owners (principals). Historically, one of the earliest observations of the agency
problem was by Adam Smith. When discussing professional managers, Smith
proposed that "being the managers rather of other people's money than of their
own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same
anxious vigilance" as if they were owner-managers.43 One extension of such logic
is that movement away from owner-controlled companies to management-
controlled companies may increase compliance costs and provide more
opportunities for managers to behave in ways that do not always serve the best
interests of investors. Modern securities regulation laws, accounting standards,
and stock-exchange listing requirements attempt to minimize the scope for
managerial self-interest. For example, as mentioned earlier, since April 2009,
NZSX-listed companies have been required (by Listing Rule 10.5.5) to disclose in
their annual reports the extent to which their corporate governance practices differ
from the NZSX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code. 44
TABLE 1
Classification of Control Types
Classification Deemed to Exist When
Majority Over 50% of capital held by one holder or a tightly knit group.
Minority An individual or small cohesive group of shareholders holds sufficient votes
to be able to dominate the company through their interest. Exists where
there is an important minority interest or family group accounting for
between 15% to 50% of votes.
Joint Minority interest strengthened by a close association with management, or
management control enhanced by a sizeable minority interest. One of two
situations may apply:
* Owning a minority interest of 10% to 15% coupled with board
representation, or
* Owning or controlling a minority interest of more than 5% with board
representation and active management involvement.
Management Ownership is so widely distributed that no one individual or group has a
minority interest that is large enough to allow them to exert dominance over
the company's affairs.
43. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1776, at 700 (Modem Library, Edwin
Cannan ed., 1937). The classic modem formulation of the agency problem is Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
44. NZSX LISTING RULES, supra note 24, r. 10.5.5. The NZSX Corporate
Governance Best Practice Code is contained in Appendix 16 to the NZSX Listing Rules.
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Table 2 contains a summary of the results of studies that use Fogelberg's
classification scheme of corporate control.45 Fogelberg's own study looked at
large companies listed in both 1962 and 1974.46 Fogelberg's data demonstrated
that a significant proportion of companies were management controlled in 1962,
and this trend continued through to 1974.47 He attributed increasing firm size as a
key contributor to management control, noting:
[I]t is also apparent that the larger the individual company the
more likely it is to be management controlled . . . . The findings
support the proposition that once a company reaches a certain
size, then, with few exceptions, dominant ownership and control
of it is beyond the resources of an individual or small group of
shareholders. Control effectively passes to those who manage
and direct the company.48
45. Data for 1962 and 1974 are from Fogelberg, supra note 42. Data for 1981 are
from Richard F. Chandler & Brian D. Henshall, Corporate Directorship Practices in New
Zealand Listed Public Companies (Dep't of Mgmt. Studies, Working Paper No. 8, Univ. of
Auckland, 1982). All other data is from Mark A. Fox & Gordon R. Walker, Sharemarket
Ownership and Securities Regulation in New Zealand, 17 N.Z. U. L. REV. 402 (1997); Fox
& Walker, Regulatory Design, supra note 34; Mark A. Fox, Gordon R. Walker & Alma
Pekmezovic, Corporate Control of New Zealand Stockmarket (NZSX) Companies: The
2009 Data, 28 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 494 (2010). It is not always a straightforward matter
to identify the major security holders in New Zealand listed companies. Lloyd Kavanagh, a
member of the former Securities Commission observed: "Despite the importance of this
disclosure, compliance is not always optimal. High Court remedies have always been
available for breaches, and thanks to litigation funding the Commission has been able once
again to take serious cases to the Court. The most recent was last year where we obtained
interim orders against the manager of the National Property Trust in respect of relevant
interests it held in the trust. A shortcoming to date in this law has been the lack of any
remedy other than High Court proceedings. This makes it difficult to secure disclosure
quickly in cases where material information has not been given to the market." Kavanagh
also notes that High Court proceedings constitute an expensive enforcement option. Lloyd
Kavanagh, Speech at the Companies and Securities Law Conference, Analysing the New
Role of the Securities Commission (May 16, 2005).
46. These were companies with shareholder funds in excess of $2 million.
47. Fogelberg, supra note 42. In an earlier publication, Fogelberg looked at the
ownership and control of twelve of New Zealand's listed companies in both 1962 and 1974.
In both years, only one company was majority controlled. In 1962 four companies were
minority controlled, but this number decreased to two companies by 1974. Only two
companies were minority controlled in 1962, and none in 1974. The number of
management-controlled companies increased from five in 1962 to nine in 1974. In light of
these changes, Fogelberg observed, "It is apparent that by the early 1960s, even in New
Zealand's largest companies, the movement towards management control was substantial.
However, some twelve years later, the movement is almost complete with 75 percent of the
companies being classified as management controlled." Graeme Fogelberg, Ownership
and Control of New Zealand's Largest Listed Companies, ACCOUNTANT'S J., Aug. 1978, at
247; see also id. at 245.
48. Fogelberg, supra note 42, at 71.
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From Table 2 it is clear that movements away from management control
and toward majority and minority control took place in the late 1970s and became
more pronounced in the early 1980s. Majority control companies increased from
7% in 1974 to 22.1% in 1981, and management control companies decreased from
48.8% to 30.4% over the same period.49  Subsequently, from the late 1990s
through to 2009, management-controlled companies became more commonplace,
increasing from 3.7% in 1996 to 29.1% in 2009. From 1996 to 2009, majority
controlled companies became less prevalent, decreasing from 46.7% to 19.9%.
Over this same time, minority controlled companies also declined, while joint
controlled companies increased. Generally, the data in Table 2 indicate that after
the mid-1990s, NZSX companies were less likely to be majority controlled and
were increasingly more likely to be management controlled.
TABLE 2
Control Types of New Zealand Listed Companies, 1962 to 2009
1962 1974 1981 1985 1990 1993
Majority 16.3% 7.0% 22.1% 37.8% 54.5% 50.0%
Minority 32.6 30.2 38.2 48.3 38.8 41.4
Joint 11.6 14.0 9.3 7.0 3.0 6.0
Management 39.5 48.8 30.4 7.0 3.7 2.6
No. of Companies 43 43 204 143 134 116
1996 1999 2001 2003 2005 2009
Majority 46.7% 40.0% 35.5% 32.1% 27.9% 19.9%
Minority 44.4 45.2 46.8 39.4 38.3 40.4
Joint 5.2 2.6 3.2 8.8 9.3 10.6
Management 3.7 12.2 14.5 19.7 24.6 29.1
No. of Companies 135 115 124 137 183 141
While there has been a decline in the majority control of New Zealand
listed companies in general, ownership of those companies has become
increasingly global in nature (see Table 3).50 Foreign control had risen from 1985
49. Chandler & Henshall, supra note 45, at 18. Chandler and Henshall classified
Fogelberg's 1962 and 1974 data into one of three ownership categories: "family,"
"corporate," or "management." They contrasted 1962 and 1974 data with the types of
control for the thirty-two companies that remained in 1981 from Fogelberg's original
sample. From 1962 to 1981, control by family interests declined by 85%, while
management control increased by 35%. Consistent with Fogelberg's observations about
management control increasing as firm size increases, Chandler and Henshall propose that
their own findings would seem to indicate that "control is related to corporate size, i.e.,
large companies will be predominantly controlled by management, medium-sized
companies will tend to show a spread of control between the controllers, and small
companies will tend to be controlled by family interests." Id.
50. Data for 1985, 1990, and 1993 is from Mark A. Fox & Matthew R. Roy,
Corporate Control and Foreign Ownership of New Zealand Listed Equities, 1(2) N.Z.
STRATEGIC MGMT. 24 (1994). Data for 1996, 1999, and 2001 is from Mark A. Fox &
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to 1996 (from 16.8% to 26.7%); however, by 1999, 38.3% of listed companies
were foreign controlled.5'
Data from the ownership composition of Top 40 listed companies also
provides useful insights into the dynamics behind ownership changes (see Table
4)52 Generally, overseas institutions increased their ownership of Top 40
companies (from 10% in 1989 to 36% in 1998). Overseas corporates also
increased ownership from 9% to 21%. At the same time, ownership of the Top 40
companies by local corporate declined from 21% in 1989 to 8% in 1998. Part of
this decline may have been due to the divestment of assets by holding companies
such as Brierley Investments Limited.53 Returning to the ideas inherent in agency
theory (and implicit in Fogelberg's classification scheme of corporate control), we
note there is mixed empirical support for the notion that management control leads
to self-serving behavior in New Zealand.54 For 1985, Mark A. Fox and Robert T.
Hamilton found no relationship between the levels of diversification of ninety-six
listed companies and their control structure (as defined by Fogelberg).55 They
tentatively observed that diversification was motivated by an (often misguided)
attempt to improve financial performance, rather than an attempt to increase firm
size (which is typically associated with increased managerial compensation and
reduced employment risk for executives).ss Michael Firth looked at the financial
Gordon R. Walker, Ownership and Foreign Control of NZSE Companies, 20 COMPANY &
SEC. L.J. 56 (2002).
51. Chandler and Henshall do not use Fogelberg's definition of control. However,
for 204 listed companies in 1981, Chandler and Henshall note that "[t]here are twenty
companies in which over 50 percent of the capital was owned by overseas interests and a
further six in which 25 to 50 percent of the capital was under overseas control." Chandler
& Henshall, supra note 45, at 20. Chandler and Henshall conclude that in 1981, around
13% of listed companies were under overseas control (i.e., had 25% or more of voting
capital controlled by overseas interests, or were a New Zealand branch of a company that
was incorporated overseas). Id.
52. Doyle Paterson Brown, Ltd., Ownership Structure of the New Zealand
Stockmarket, Mar. 1996. See also Mark A. Fox & Gordon R. Walker, Foreign Control of
NZSE Companies: New Zealand Evidence, 18 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 283 (2000).
53. Brierley Investments Grounded, EcoNoMIST, Aug. 22, 1998, at 50. Note that in
his heyday, Sir Ron Brierley and the companies he led (first BIL and later Industrial
Equities Limited) were influential in unlocking hidden shareholder value. A recent article
calls Brierley the "scourge of lazy boards" and his retirement "the end of a colourful type
of shareholder activism." See Tony Boyd, Exit Sir Ron, Scourge ofLazy Boards, WEEKEND
AUSTL. FIN. REv., Feb. 12-13, 2011, at 64.
54. The focus of much of the research on corporate governance is on how corporate
control or board characteristics influence financial performance. Of course, financial
performance (or even firm survival) may be undermined through various self-serving
activities on the parts of directors, investors, or managers. Some of these actions may
constitute corruption. See Susan Watson & Rebecca Hirsch, The Link Between Corporate
Governance and Corruption in New Zealand, 24 N.Z. U. L. REv. 42 (2010).
55. Mark A. Fox & Robert T. Hamilton, Ownership and Diversification: Agency
Theory or Stewardship Theory, 31 J. MGMT. STUD. 69, 75 (1994).
56. Id. at 76.
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performance of 149 listed companies from 1986 and concluded that a "manager-
controlled firms' profitability behavior is no different from other categories of
companies." 7 A subsequent study by Fox examined control structure for 1990
and its impact on average financial performance for 1991 to 1993 and found no
correlation between ownership and subsequent financial performance. 8
TABLE 3
Foreign Control of New Zealand Listed Companies, 1985 to 2001
1985 1990
Foreign Total % Foreign Foreign Total % Foreign
Controlled Companies Controlled Controlled Companies Controlled
Companies Companies
Majority 18 54 33.3 21 73 28.8
Minority 6 69 8.7 12 52 23.1
Joint 0 10 0 0 4 0
Management 0 10 0 0 5 0
Totals 24 143 16.8 33 134 24.6
1993 1996
Foreign Total % Foreign Foreign Total % Foreign
Controlled Companies Controlled Controlled Companies Controlled
Companies Companies
Majority 31 58 53.4 36 63 57.1
Minority 14 48 29.2 24 60 40
Joint 1 7 14.3 2 7 28.6
Management 0 3 0 1 5 20
Totals 46 116 39.7 63 135 46.7
1999 2001
Foreign Total % Foreign Foreign Total % Foreign
Controlled Companies Controlled Controlled Companies Controlled
Companies Companies
Majority 24 46 52.2 15 44 34.1
Minority 15 52 28.9 18 58 31
Joint 1 3 33.3 2 4 50
Management 4 14 28.6 3 18 16.7
Totals 44 115 38.3 38 124 30.6
57. Michael Firth, Control-type and the Financial Structure and Performance ofNew
Zealand Firms, 26(1) N.Z. ECON. PAPERS 1, 16-17 (1992). Firms were classified as owner-
controlled if there was a single shareholder (or closely associated group) who owned 20%
of stock and was thought to exercise some form of control. In contrast, owner-managed
firms were those that were not owner-controlled.
58. Mark A. Fox, Corporate Control and Financial Performance of New Zealand
Companies 6-7 (Dep't of Econ. & Mktg., Discussion Paper No. 14, Lincoln Univ., 1996),
available at http://researcharchive.lincoln.ac.nz/dspace/bitstream/101 82/972/3/cddp
14.pdf (Financial performance was measured by return on assets and return on equity.).
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TABLE 4
Top 40 New Zealand Listed Companies, Ownership Changes, 1980 to 1998
Type of Investor Dec. 89 Mar. 91 Aug. 91 Mar. 92 Dec. 92 Mar. 93 Sept. 93
Local Institutions 16 14 12 12 14 15 17
Overseas 10 17 22 23 24 25 27
Institutions
Local Corporates 21 15 11 11 10 9 7
ESOPs 4 8 4 4 4 4 3
Overseas 9 6 20 20 20 19 16
Corporates 9 6 2
Other 40 40 31 30 28 28 30
Totals
Institutions 26 31 34 35 38 40 44
Corporates 30 21 31 31 40 28 23
Overseas 19 23 42 43 44 44 43
Type of Investor Nov. 94 May 95 Aug. 95 Mar. 96 July 96 Aug. 97 July 98
Local Institutions 14 13 11 11 10 11 15
Overseas 31 29 31 32 32 32 36
Institutions
Local Corporates 9 8 9 8 7 8 8
ESOPs 3 3 3 3 2 1 1
Overseas 20 25 25 26 29 29 21
Corporates
Other 23 21 20 20 20 19 19
Totals
Institutions 45 42 42 42 42 43 51
Corporates 29 33 34 34 36 37 29
Overseas 51 54 56 58 61 61 57
B. Insider Ownership: The Intersection of Owner and Management Control
Ownership by insiders is also commonly thought to cause agency
problems. Andrew K. Prevost, Ramesh Rao, and Mahmud Hossain looked at a
sample of NZSE firms from 1991 to 1997. Their pooled data showed insider
ownership of 6.8% and Top 20 shareholder ownership of 76.3%. 9 Insider
ownership had a strong, positive association with performance. Further, their
findings suggest "excessive ownership concentration may actually be detrimental
to firm performance.,,60 However, a study of the Top 50 listed companies from
59. Mahmud Hossain et al., Corporate Governance in New Zealand: The Effect of
the 1993 Companies Act on the Relation Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 9 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 119 (2001). Insider ownership was defined as
"proportion of equity beneficially held by all members of the board of directors including
top officers of the firm who are members of the board to total shares outstanding." Id. at
131.
60. Id. at 139. Insider ownership may also play a role in influencing decisions about
financial disclosures. Y. T. Mak examined the relationship between insider ownership and
voluntary disclosure of forecast information in prospectuses for initial public offerings. He
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1999 to 2007 by Krishna Reddy, Stuart Locke, and Frank Scrimgeour found no
link between insider ownership (defined as the proportion of ordinary shares held
by board members) and financial performance. 6 ' However, large stock holdings
were found to contribute positively to financial performance. 62 This could be
because holders of large blocks are more vigilant in protecting their investments
than smaller shareholders.6 3  Another study also found that concentrated
proposed that when insider ownership (e.g., by managers and directors) was higher, there
would be less need to voluntarily disclose information because insiders and outsiders are
already likely to have their interests aligned. However, when looking at a sample of ninety-
two prospectuses for 1983 to 1988, he found no relationship between insider ownership and
voluntary disclosures. The mean level of insider ownership was 55.2%, when insider
ownership consisted of shares allocated to be issued to related companies, promoters,
management, staff, and directors. See Y. T. Mak, Corporate Characteristics and the
Voluntary Disclosure of Forecast Information: A Study of New Zealand Prospectuses, 23
BRIT. AcCT. REv. 305 (1991). More recently, Haiyan Jiang and Ahsan Habib looked at the
influence of the type of ownership concentration on annual report voluntary disclosures for
a sample of listed companies from 2001 to 2005. See Haiyan Jiang & Ahsan Habib, The
Impact of Different Types of Ownership Concentration on Annual Report Voluntary
Disclosures in New Zealand, 22 ACCT. REs. J. 275 (2009). A key finding of this study is
that "different types of controlling shareholders affect corporate disclosures differently."
Id. at 299. Companies that were controlled by financial institutions disclosed significantly
less when ownership concentration was higher. Among the reasons proffered was lack of
financial shareholder activism in New Zealand and lack of physical proximity of many
controlling financial institutions. Firms with management-controlled or government-
controlled ownership structures disclosed significantly more when ownership concentration
was higher. The authors proposed that greater disclosures at higher concentration levels by
government-controlled firms may be motivated by concerns for social responsibility and
accountability. Id.
61. Krishna Reddy, Stuart Locke & Frank Scrimgeour, The Efficacy of Principle-
based Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Financial Performance, 6(3) INT'L J.
MANAGERIAL FIN. 190 (2010). This finding is confirmed by a study of small cap
companies. See Krishna Reddy et al., Corporate Governance Practices of Small Cap
Companies and Their Financial Performance: An Empirical Study in New Zealand, I INT'L
J. Bus. GOVERNANCE & ETHICS 51 (2008). It also appears that insider ownership (typically
defined as ownership by directors, divided by total shares outstanding) is higher in smaller
companies than in larger ones. A study of fifty large firms from 1999 to 2005 reported
mean insider ownership of 14.4%. See Krishna Reddy, Abeyratna Gunasekarage, Frank
Scrimgeour & Stuart Locke, Corporate Governance Practices of Large Firms in New
Zealand and Firm Performances: An Empirical Investigation (19th Australian Finance and
Banking Conference, Sydney, Dec. 15-19, 2006). This contrasts with a mean insider
ownership ratio of 31.3% in the study of small cap firms from 2001 to 2005. Reddy et al.,
Small Cap Companies, supra.
62. The mean proportion of stock held by the twenty largest shareholders was 69.3%.
Reddy et al., Small Cap Companies, supra note 61.
63. There are several explanations for this phenomenon. Reddy, Locke &
Scrimgeour point out that their findings on insider ownership and financial performance
may differ from those of Hossain et al., because of differences in sampling. (The latter
study includes both small and large companies, and small companies tend to have a higher
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ownership had a positive association with financial performance but that this
relationship was strongest for companies whose major investor was a financial
institution. 64
Much of the research discussed above assumes (but by no means
confirms) that diffusion of ownership diminishes firm value. However, such a
linear relationship has been questioned. For example, based on data for New
Zealand listed companies in 1994 to 1998, Gurmeet Singh Bhabra found a
curvilinear relationship between insider ownership (defined as beneficial
ownership by directors) and firm value.65  Insider ownership was positively
related to firm value for ownership levels below 14% and above 40% (and
inversely related between those levels). The rationale for this finding is that
market discipline may increase firm value at low levels of managerial ownership,
and there is a convergence of interests at high levels of ownership. At
intermediate levels, by contrast, managers may become entrenched, and associated
agency costs may be higher.66 In this regard, a study by Prevost, Rao, and
Hossain found that insider ownership had a nonlinear impact on financial
performance, but "ownership concentration has little systematic effect on firm
performance." 67
C. Institutional Investors
Institutional ownership levels may also play a role in mediating any
governance-performance relationship.6 t Institutional shareholders may enhance
firm value in a number of ways, including encouraging capital market efficiency
and liquidity; monitoring efforts of the companies they invest in, possibly
proportion of insider ownership.) The conventional legal explanation is that block
shareholdings are a response to weak regulation.
64. Nicholas Boone, Sisira Colombage & Abeyratna Gunasekarage, Block
Shareholder Identity and Firm Performance in New Zealand, 13 PAC. AccT. REV. 185
(2011).
65. Gurmeet Singh Bhabra, Insider Ownership and Firm Value in New Zealand,
17(2) J. MULTINATIONAL FIN. MGMT. 142 (2007).
66. Research from an unpublished thesis also supports the idea of a nonlinear
ownership-financial performance relationship. In a study of seventy-nine listed companies,
Hannah Maling found that ownership and firm value were positively related when
ownership levels were below 16% or above 58%. See Hannah Maling, Managerial
Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from New Zealand (Feb. 10, 2000) (unpublished
Master of Business Research Report, Univ. of Otago).
67. Andrew K. Prevost, Ramesh P. Rao & Mahmud Hossain, Determinants of Board
Composition in New Zealand: A Simultaneous Equations Approach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL FIN.
373, 394 (2002).
68. Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Securities Regulation and New Zealand
Sharemarket Patterns, 1989-1993, 5 J. BANKING FIN. L. & PRAC. 244 (1994); Gordon R.
Walker & Mark A. Fox, Institutional Investment and Ownership Concentration in New
Zealand Listed Companies, 7 J. BANKING FIN. L. & PRAc. 356 (1996).
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affecting significant changes in corporate governance and strategy (or
discouraging moves that often harm performance, such as excessive
diversification); and taking action to stifle or stop excessive compensation
schemes or schemes that show a disconnect between compensation and firm
performance.
Farshid Navissi and Vic Naiker's research examined 123 New Zealand
listed companies that had at least 5% institutional ownership in 1994.70 The
average institutional shareholding was 22%. However, Navissi and Naiker note
that "simply examining the overall shareholding by institutional investors does not
consider the level of monitoring exercised by these investors."n Accordingly,
they categorize institutional investors as either "active" or "passive." Active
investors have board representation and passive investors do not. Institutional
ownership of up to 30% was found to generally improve firm value (as measured
by market-to-book value), and ownership over 30% reduced firm value.72 Hence,
Navissi and Naiker suggest:
It is possible that institutional investors (similar to corporate
insiders) will decrease firm value once their shareholdings
exceed a certain level. That is, active monitoring may improve
firm value (convergence-of-interest hypothesis) only up to a
certain level of shareholding. At higher levels of share
ownership, institutional institutions may encourage sub-optimal
decisions that could be harmful to the firm (entrenchment
hypothesis). 73
69. Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Institutional Investors and the Brierley
Investments Limited Executive Share Options Scheme, 13 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 344
(1995). This article discusses successful efforts by institutional investors to get Brierley
Investments Limited to drop a proposed option scheme for directors. The proposed scheme
had undemanding performance standards and occurred within the context where several
directors were selling down their holdings in the company. See also Aik Win Tan & Trish
Keeper, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: A New Zealand Perspective
(Center for Accounting, Governance & Taxation Research, Sch. of Accounting &
Commercial Law, Victoria Univ. of Wellington, Working Paper No. 65, Oct. 2008),
available at http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/working-papers/WP65.pdf.
70. Farshid Navissi & Vic Naiker, Institutional Ownership and Corporate Value, 32
MANAGERIAL FIN. 247 (2006). Note that 1994 was the first year of mandatory disclosure of
distribution of equity under the Financial Reporting Act of 1993.
71. Id. at 255.
72. These findings are interesting in light of a study of 259 firm year observations
from 2000 to 2003 that showed that the top institutional shareholder ratio was negatively
associated with firm value, indicating that "a dominating institution may hurt firm value."
See Jianguo Chen & Dar-Hsin Chen, Does Institutional Ownership Create Values?: The
New Zealand Case 13 (N.Z. Fin. Colloquium Paper, Oct. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.nzfc.ac.nz/archives/2008/papers/08 10 .pdf.
73. Navissi & Naiker, supra note 70, at 249.
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More generally, some insight into the impact of institutional investors on
governance practices is found in a survey of fund managers who invested in New
Zealand listed companies. 4 Typically, these fund managers preferred investing in
companies with independent board chairs, a majority of independent directors, a
majority of independent directors on remuneration committees, and performance-
based compensation for executives (they also viewed this as desirable for
nonexecutive directors). Nevertheless, fund managers tended to believe that
governance guidelines should be applied on a case-by-case basis, with authors
Peggy Chiu and John Monin noting that these managers tended to believe that
"the corporate governance framework should not be considered as a body of rules
that cannot be overridden.,75 This viewpoint is consistent with the notion of
strategic governance reform and fits with a model of governance based on a
"comply or explain model."76 Similarly, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, in
an international review of the literature focusing on the legal protection of
investors and ownership concentration, note that they "do not believe that the
available evidence tells [them] which one of the successful governance systems is
the best."77  Megan Goldfinch echoes these sentiments with respect to New
Zealand Listing Rules: "[E]ach firm has its optimal governance structure that is
determined by firm-specific factors and the institutional environment that the firm
faces."78
D. The Role of Executive Compensation
The impact of corporate control on financial performance is affected by
the mediating role of executive compensation. Research on thirty-six New
74. Peggy Chiu & John Monin, Effective Corporate Governance: From the
Perspective of New Zealand Fund Managers, 11(2) CORP. GOVERNANCE 123 (2003). We
also note that fund managers can have conflicts of interest that lead them to behave in ways
that are not in the best interests of all shareholders. C.B. Ingley and N.T. van der Walt state
that governance concerns arise as "most fund managers are short-term speculators, not
long-term owners, and because of the conflicts of interest they incur when fund managers'
largest clients are firms that comprise the corporate investment pool." See C.B. Ingley &
N.T. van der Walt, Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Conflicts of Interest,
12 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REv. 534, 534 (2004).
75. Chiu & Monin, supra note 74, at 129.
76. Brian K. Boyd et al., Who Wins in Governance Reform?, in STRATEGIC
DISCOVERY: COMPETING IN NEw ARENAS 237 (Howard Thomas & Don O'Neal eds., 1997).
Brian K. Boyd et al., International Corporate Governance Reform, 12 EUR. Bus. J. 116
(2000).
77. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 774 (1997). For another useful review of the governance literature, see Diane K.
Denis, Twenty-five Years of Corporate Governance Research ... and Counting, 10 REV.
FIN. ECON. 191 (2001).
78. Megan Goldfinch, Do the NZSE Listing Rules Destroy Value?, 6 U. AUCKLAND
Bus. REV. 1, 7 (2004).
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Zealand companies from 1998 to 2000 found that total compensation was
significantly influenced by present, past, and future financial performance. This
supports the view that the negative impact of agency conflicts on firm
performance "are minimized when executives become owners of their own firms
since executive remuneration becomes tied to the long-term performance of the
firm."79
Looking at data from 431 listed firm year observations (the sum of
observations across all years examined) from 2001 to 2005, Haiyan Jiang, Ahsan
Habib, and Clive Smallman observed a nonlinear effect of ownership
concentration on the CEO compensation-firm performance relationship.o CEO
compensation was negatively related to corporate financial performance when
ownership concentration was high and positively related when ownership
concentration was low. These results indicate that "large controlling shareholders
seem dysfunctional in curbing managerial power, evidenced by their support of
firm-performance detached CEO compensation scheme." 1 When ownership
concentration is lower, by contrast, any individual shareholder has less power and
may be less likely to attempt to expropriate firm resources.
III. INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIPS
The studies on corporate control discussed in Part II give us some idea of
the nature of who holds power over New Zealand's listed companies.
Interlocking directorships are another common means of assessing power relations
in business that are secondary in influence to ownership.82 With regard to
interlocking directorships, Georgina Murray proposes that "[p]ower, in this
context, means having a key member of your board inter-lock with (or sit on)
someone else's board, thereby feeding you information from a wide corporate
environmental scan about the machinations of inter-firm politics."83  Another
common view of interlocks (known as resource dependence theory) sees them as a
means of co-opting resources from the environment.84  Such a view is not
79. Abeyratna Gunasekarage & Michael Wilkinson, CEO Compensation and Firm
Performance: A New Zealand Investigation, 10 INT'L J. Bus. STUD. 45, 52 (2002).
80. Haiyan Jiang, Ahsan Habib & Clive Smallman, The Effect of Ownership
Concentration on CEO Compensation-Firm Performance Relationship in New Zealand,
21(2) PAC. AcCT. REv. 104 (2009).
81. Id. at 124.
82. Georgina Murray, Interlocks or Ownership: New Zealand Boardroom Power, 16
N.Z. Soc. 176 (2001).
83. Id. at 177. Murray's research examined interlocks among all of the Top 30 New
Zealand companies, not just listed companies. See also Georgina Murray, New Zealand
Corporate Capitalism (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Auckland), available
at https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/2038.
84. See generally Amy J. Hillman et al., Resource Dependence Theory: A Review, 35
J. OF MGMT. 1404 (2009). The importance of co-opting resources is given credence by
Graeme Fogelberg and Clinton R. Laurent's study of 160 large listed companies. See
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inconsistent with Murray's view of interlocks as providing useful information to
directors.
There are three major corporate governance issues that arise from
directors sitting on multiple boards: (1) directors may face conflicts of interests
between their duties to several companies or between the duty to the company and
self-interest; (2) directors with several board positions may be unable to gain a
satisfactory understanding of each company's business; and (3) multiple
directorships may affect a director's independence and thereby impede his or her
ability to effectively monitor the company's executive management. However,
as we will demonstrate, New Zealand listed companies have had relatively low
levels of interlocking directorships in recent years. 86
Studies of interlocking directorships tend to focus on two types of
interlocks: company interlocks and director interlocks. Company interlocks refer
to the number of other listed companies with which any given listed company has
directors in common. Director interlocks refer to the total number of board
positions held on other boards by a given company's own directors.
Historical data on interlocking directorships are presented in Tables 5
and 6.8 The number of company interlocks has decreased from 7.0 for 1984 to
Graeme Fogelberg & Clinton R. Laurent, Interlocking Directorates: A Study of Large
Companies in New Zealand, 3(2) J. Bus. POL'Y 16 (1973). Of all interlocks, 19% were
with competitors, 29.2% were with customers, and 22.5% were with finance companies).
Further, interlocks with suppliers were commonplace in meat, textile, printing, fertilizer,
electrical machinery, and stock and station industries.
85. Jeffrey Lawrence, Multiple Directorships and Conflicts of Interest: Recent
Developments, 14 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 513 (1996). See also Hon. Justice Tompkins,
Directing the Directors: The Duties of Directors Under the Companies Act 1993, 2
WAIKATO L. REv. 76 (1995).
86. Erik Devos et al., Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?, 38 FiN. MGMT.
861 (2009). Based on a sample of 3,566 U.S. and Canadian firms for the years 2001 to
2003, poorly performing companies were more likely to have interlocked directors on their
boards.
In further analysis, we find that the market reacts negatively to the
announcement of director appointments that create interlocked boards.
In addition, we find that interlocked directors are associated with lower
than optimal pay-performance sensitivity of CEO incentive
compensation. Finally, we find evidence that interlocked directors
lower the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior firm performance.
Collectively, our results suggest that the presence of interlocked
directors is indicative of poorly governed firms. From a public policy
perspective, regulatory authorities and activist institutional investors
may take these findings into consideration when making
recommendations on the optimal structure of corporate boards."
Id. at 862.
87. For data from 1962 and 1970, see Graeme Fogelberg, A Study of the Ownership
and Control of Public Companies in New Zealand (1963) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
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1.94 for 2009. Similarly, the number of director interlocks has declined from 7.97
for 1984 to 2.20 in 2009. Also, the incidence of directors holding multiple
directorships has become less commonplace over time. For 1970, Clinton Laurent
found that 566 of 876 (65%) of directors held more than one board position.
However, by 2009 only 82 (9.2%) out of 753 directors held more than one board
position. 89
One reason for the decline in interlocks since the 1980s is a decrease in
the number of listed companies, meaning there are fewer opportunities for
interlocks in the first instance. We suspect the decline is also due to fewer
ownership connections between listed entities that have common directors as a
means of coordination and control.
Some directors are more likely than others to be on multiple boards.
Fogelberg and Laurent found that larger companies tend to have more interlocks,
as did companies controlled by a minority (rather than a family) interest.90 They
also found that some industries tended to have more interlocks (meat and
beverage; wood, pulp, and paper; printing and publishing; fertilizers; retail; and
finance).9 Subsequently, Roy, Fox, and Hamilton and Firth also found that larger
companies tend to have more interlocks and that some industries are more likely
than others to have more interlocks. 92 Roy, Fox, and Hamilton found that more
interlocks occurred in the insurance, liquor, forestry, finance, and banking
industries.
Victoria Univ. of Wellington); Clinton R. Laurent, Interlocking Directorates in New
Zealand (1971) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Victoria); Fogelberg & Laurent,
supra note 84. For data from 1972 and 1984, see Michael Firth, Multiple Directorships
and Corporate Interlocks in New Zealand Firms, 23 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. Soc. 274 (1987). For
data from 1981, see Chandler & Henshall, supra note 45. For the basis of the 1984 CEO
duality figure, which is formed from a sample of 184 companies, see R. Tumer, Board of
Directors Leadership, 7 N.Z. J. Bus. 59 (1985). For data from 1980 and 1985, see Mark A.
Fox, Studies of Corporate Governance in New Zealand (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Univ. of Canterbury), available at http://www.ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/4347. For
interlocks data from 1987, 1990, and 1993, see Matthew W. Roy, Mark A. Fox & Robert T.
Hamilton, Board Size and Potential Corporate and Director Interlocks in Australasia
1984-1993, 19 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 201 (1994). For Interlocks data from 1996 and 1999, see
Mark A. Fox & Gordon R. Walker, Multiple Directorships and Interlocks Among New
Zealand Stock Exchange Companies, 1996 to 2001, 19 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 467 (2001).
For interlocks data from 2003 to 2009, see Mark A. Fox, Gordon R. Walker & Alma
Pekmezovic, Interlocking Directorships and Female Directors in New Zealand: The 2009
Data, 28 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 496 (2010). For noninterlocks data from 1987 to 2005, see
Mark A. Fox & Gordon R. Walker, Board Composition and New Zealand Stockmarket
Companies, 24 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. (2006); Fox, Walker & Pekmezovic, supra note 35.
88. Laurent, supra note 87.
89. Fox, Walker & Pekmezovic, Interlocking Directorships, supra note 87.
90. Fogelberg & Laurent, supra note 84.
91. Id.
92. Roy, Fox & Hamilton, supra note 87; Firth, supra note 87.
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Fox and Roy found that board chairs and nonexecutives were most likely
to be on the boards of other companies. 93 They observed, "[T]here is an 'inner
circle' of directors holding the majority of interlocks among the inner circle of
directors holding all interlocks." 94 This may be because executive directors have
less time to be professional directors, or accepting directorships of other
companies may be seen as showing a lack of devotion to their executive roles.
Board chairs may be more likely to be on multiple boards as they have greater
expertise and experience than other directors. Recent data also indicates that
when women are on boards, they are more likely to have interlocks than their
male counterparts. 95
TABLE 5
Characteristics of New Zealand Listed Company Boards, 1962 to 1987
Year 1962 1970 1972 1980 1981 1984 1985 1987
Board Size 7.21 6.96 6.66 7.24 6.95 7.12 7.45 6.14
Mean Directorships 3.10 1.28 1.38 1.35
Per Director
Mean Multiple 4.25 2.83 3.00 2.71
Directorships Held
No. of Directors 876 1,291 1,143 1,326
No. of Directorships 2,718 1,646 1,574 1,793
Company Interlocks 7.00 4.42
Director Interlocks 7.97 5.59
CEO Duality (%) 17.83 11.14 10.81 17.81
Independent Chairs (%)
Executive Chairs (%) 20.16 14.19 18.49
Nonexecutive Directors 5.45 4.9 5.60 4.48
(average #)
Independent Directors
(average #)
Nonexecutives (%) 75.00 71.50 75.83 72.60
Independent Directors
(%)__ _ _
Sample 58 160 247 129 208 221 148 292
93. Mark A. Fox & Matthew R. Roy, Composition of Boards of Directors and
Interlocks in New Zealand, 1987 to 1993, 10 N.Z. Soc. 17 (1995).
94. Id.
95. In 2009, female directors held only 59 of the 753 total board positions (7.7%).
However, when women are on boards, they tend to have more interlocking directorships
than their male counterparts. On average, men held only 1.15 directorships, whereas
women held an average of 1.22 directorships. See Fox, Walker & Pekmezovic,
Interlocking Directorships, supra note 87.
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TABLE 6
Characteristics of New Zealand Listed Company Boards, 1990 to 2009
Year 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 2003 2005 2009
Board Size 5.69 6.14 6.15 6.40 6.00 6.56 6.43 6.08
Mean directorships 1.23 1.22 1.20 1.21 1.25 1.21 1.19 1.15
per director
Mean Multiple 2.39 2.51 2.47 2.55 2.47 2.43 2.48 2.39
Directorships Held
No. of Directors 664 666 741 723 749 859 897 753
No. of Directorships 814 815 889 875 934 1041 1066 867
Company Interlocks 2.18 2.60 2.57 2.91 2.78 2.65 2.66 1.94
Director Interlocks 3.01 3.32 3.12 3.58 2.89 2.78 2.69 2.20
CEO Duality (%) 15.38 14.29 8.82 7.38 9.16 4.26 6.03
Independent Chairs (%) 62.00 71.30
Executive Chairs (%) 17.48 16.54 13.73 9.84 15.27 14.89 12.10 6.30
Nonexecutive Chairs 4.15 4.57 4.91 5.26 4.78 5.28 5.09 4.90
(average #)
Independent Directors 3.69 3.60
(average #)
Nonexecutives (%) 72.67 74.18 78.00 81.00 78.00 81.00 79.16 80.59
Independent Directors 57.39 59.21
(%)
Sample 143 133 145 139 161 166 178 142
IV. OVERALL BOARD COMPOSITION
Boards of directors provide a mechanism through which monitoring of
management can occur on behalf of shareholders. The size, leadership, and
composition of boards influence their ability to effectively monitor management
and to support strategy development. Tables 5 and 6 contain a summary of
research findings of these board characteristics.
A. Board Size
The only NZSX requirements regarding board size (mandated in Listing
Rule 3.3.1) are that there should be a minimum of three directors (other than
alternate directors) of an issuer and at least two directors should ordinarily reside
in New Zealand. The typical board size in New Zealand has declined since 1962,
when the mean board size was 7.21 directors (see Table 5). In 1985, board size
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was around 7.5 directors; since that time, board size has declined to an average of
6.1 directors in 2009.
From a decision-making standpoint, larger boards tend to bring more
diverse perspectives to formulating strategy. Executives may also be less able to
dominate larger boards or to subvert the ability of boards to monitor executives.
Further, resource dependence theory sees directors as linking companies with
resources from their external environment. 97 Hence, having a board with more
directors may enable organizations to co-opt needed resources more successfully.
One way this occurs is through interlocking directorships. However, one concern
with larger boards is they tend to have more interlocks with other companies,
which might lead to conflicts of interest and anti-competitive behavior.
A global review of the empirical research demonstrates that board size
has a positive relationship with corporate financial performance.9 8 However,
findings on any board size/corporate performance relationship are mixed. For
example, Fox found inconsistent evidence of the impact of board size in 1987 and
1990 on subsequent financial performance." In another study, Fox found that
board size was not a significant predictor of failure for New Zealand listed
companies between 1985 and 1990.00 For a sample of 633 firm year observations
over 1991 to 1997, Prevost, Rao, and Hossain found that larger boards were
associated with poorer financial performance.' 0' Further, Reddy, Locke, and
Scrimgeour, in a study of fifty large listed firms, found no significant relationship
between board size and various measures of financial performance. 102 We suspect
the lack of clear findings regarding a board size/performance link for New
Zealand firms may be due to the relatively small size of listed company boards.
B. Presence of Independent Directors
Listing Rule 3.3.1 stipulates that at least two directors must be
independent. Where there are eight or more directors, three or one-third of the
total number of directors must be independent. The board must identify which
directors are "independent." Independent directors are not executives of the issuer
96. In 2009, all listed companies comprised three or more directors, and 81.7% of
boards comprised between three and seven directors. See Fox, Walker & Pekmezovic,
supra note 35.
97. Amy J. Hillman et al., The Resource Dependence Role of Corporate Directors:
Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to Environmental Change, 37 J.
MGMT. STUD. 235 (2000).
98. Dan R. Dalton et al., Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-
Analysis, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 674 (1999) (a meta-analytic review of 131 research samples).
99. Fox, supra note 87.
100. Mark A. Fox, Corporate Governance and Corporate Failure (Dep't of Econ. &
Mktg., Discussion Paper No. 41, Lincoln Univ., 1997), available at
http://researcharchive.1incoln.ac.nz/dspace/handle/10182/874.
101. Hossain et al., supra note 59.
102. Reddy, Locke & Scrimgeour, supra note 61.
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and do not have any disqualifying relationships (for example, being a substantial
security holder).
Research on listed companies for 1991 to 1995 by Prevost, Rao, and
Hossain finds that higher ownership by insiders (that is, ownership by
management and directors) is associated with a smaller proportion of outsiders on
boards.'o This indicates that independent directors and insider equity ownership
can operate as substitute governance mechanisms.'0 In another study, covering
listed companies for 1991 to 1997, Prevost, Rao, and Hossain found:
[O]utside directors may function as a substitute in corporate
governance for lower levels of inside ownership. [Also] very
high levels of inside ownership are associated with higher
outside directors. This suggests that firms increase their use of
outside directors in order to mitigate the potential negative
entrenchment effect brought about by high inside ownership. 0 5
Prevost, Rao, and Hossain consider that highly concentrated share
ownership in New Zealand may "imply that outside takeovers are not a viable
disciplining mechanism thus making the presence of outsiders on the board a
pivotal element in controlling agency problems." 0 6  By 2009, 59% of NZSX
listed company directors were independent (see Table 6). Nonexecutive directors
had risen from around 73% in 1987 to 81% in 2009 (see Tables 5 and 6).
It is often proposed that executives and other nonindependent directors
cannot be relied on to impartially monitor their own performance because of an
inherent conflict of interest. Such conflicts of interest are more likely to occur
when executives have little stake in the corporations they manage. 0 7 While there
are compelling arguments in favor of independent directors, there are also
arguments in favor of representation by insiders. Independent or nonexecutive
directors may not have the time and expertise to perform effectively or understand
the complexities of the companies they serve. (This concern may be particularly
acute when directors are also CEOs or serve on many boards.) In New Zealand,
this argument was made by Megan Goldfinch who, when commenting on Listing
Rules that require a minimum of two directors (or make up one-third of a board),
observed that research indicated none of the various testing procedures seemed to
produce conclusive evidence as to the benefits of independent directors. 'os This
suggests the NZSX proposal, which mandates a minimum number of independent
directors, lacks empirical support.
103. Andrew K. Prevost, Ramesh P. Rao & Mahmud Hossain, Board Composition in
New Zealand: An Agency Perspective, 29 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 731 (2002).
104. Id.
105. Prevost, Rao & Hossain, supra note 67, at 394.
106. Prevost, Rao & Hossain, supra note 103, at 735.
107. See generally Michael C. Jensen, Self-Interest, Altruism, Incentives, and Agency
Theory, 7 J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 40 (1994).
108. Goldfinch, supra note 78, at 3.
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Despite popular wisdom extolling the benefits of independent or outside
directors, the evidence on the impact of outsiders on financial performance is
equivocal. A survey of 159 samples of board composition/financial performance
studies from around the world found that board composition has virtually no effect
on firm performance.' 09 The findings in New Zealand are mixed. Prevost, Rao,
and Hossain found that firm performance was positively influenced by the
proportion of outsiders on boards. 0 Reddy, Locke, and Scrimgeour found no
significant relationship between board independence and various measures of
financial performance for fifty large, listed firms. 1' They thought this could be
because companies already have good governance structures or that such directors
may lack the detailed company-specific knowledge of internal candidates.112
Abeyratna Gunasekarage and Debra K. Reed looked at the impact on share prices
of 463 director appointments from July 1999 to June 2004." The appointment of
outsiders did not lead, per se, to abnormal stock returns. In the New Zealand
context, it also appears that companies with a majority of outsiders on their boards
may be more likely to fail.114
Ahmed, Hossain, and Adams examined data for nonfinancial listed
companies for 604 firm year observations from 1991 to 1997."' They observed
that outside directors increased from 52% in 1991-94 to 62% in 1995-97. Since
board size remained relatively stable, the authors speculated the increase "is a
measured response by listed corporations to the reform package that was
passed.""'6 The 1993 Companies Act had made it possible for investors to bring
109. Dan R. Dalton et al., Meta-analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership
Structure, and Financial Performance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269 (1998).
110. Hossain et al., supra note 59.
111. Reddy, Locke & Scrimgeour, supra note 61.
112. Id.
113.Abeyratna Gunasekarage & Debra K. Reed, The Market Reaction to the
Appointment of Outside Directors: An Analysis of the Interaction Between the Agency
Problem and the Affiliation ofDirectors, 4 INT'L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 259 (2008).
114. Fox, supra note 87. This research suggests it is desirable that the balance of
power on boards should not rest with outsiders. There are several reasons why this may be
the case: outsiders as a whole may lack the insight into the activities of a firm and its
environment that those involved in the company on a day-to-day basis possess. These
attributes may be particularly pertinent to ensuring corporate survival. As Fox observes, "It
appears that boards dominated by outsiders may, in effect, hamstring executives from the
pursuit and implementation of those strategies which best ensure the very survival of their
company." Id. at 74. However, the measure of outsiders used in the study is somewhat
restrictive and may not adequately capture independence. Hence, the findings should be
regarded as indicative only.
115. Kamran Ahmed, Mahmud Hossain & Mike B. Adams et al., The Effects of Board
Composition and Board Size on the Informativeness of Annual Accounting Earnings, 14
CoRP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 418 (2006).
116. Id. at 428 (also lending support to the notion that smaller boards are more
effective than large boards in monitoring earnings quality, although the proportion of
outsiders on boards was not significantly associated with earnings informativeness).
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direct legal action against a director alleging breach of duty of care. "7 Hence, one
concern regarding outside directors relates to risk. Alastair Marsden and Andrew
K. Prevost looked at the impact of the Companies Act 1993 on the use of
derivatives by listed companies. Using data from listed companies in 1994
(ninety-four companies) and 1997 (ninety-one companies), these authors observed
that higher growth companies with boards that comprised a greater proportion of
outside directors were less likely to use derivative contracts. They proposed
this was "consistent with the view that outside directors become more cautious as
a result of the perception of their increased risk brought about by the new
legislation . . . ."'
For a sample of sixty-nine firms that were continually listed from 1992 to
1995, Stephen F. Cahan and Brett R. Wilkinson observed that the percentage of
outside directors increased by 5.1% in the period after the passage of the
Companies Act 1993 (which came into force on July 1, 1994).120
Hossain, Cahan, and Adams conducted cross-sectional research for
seventy-seven companies as of December 2005 and concluded that high growth
rates and the use of outside directors were related.12 1 The mean proportion of
outsiders was 52%. The proportion of outside directors on boards was
significantly and positively related to firms' investment opportunity set, leverage,
and the number of board meetings and was significantly negatively related to low
levels of insider ownership and firm size.122
C. Board Leadership
According to Rule 2.1 of the Corporate Governance Best Practice Code,
a director should not simultaneously hold the positions of Chief Executive and
117. John H. Farrar, Duty of Care of Company Directors in Australia and New
Zealand, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 81-91 (Ian
Ramsay ed., 1997).
118. Alastair Marsden & Andrew K. Prevost, Derivatives Use, Corporate
Governance, and Legislative Change: An Empirical Analysis of New Zealand Listed
Companies, 32 J. Bus. FIN. & AcCT. 253, 291 (2005).
119. Id. The authors also found that outside directors increased from 41.8% in 1994 to
51.7% in 1997. This is consistent with findings from Prevost, Rao & Hossain, supra note
67, who also observed an increase in outsider director representation following the passage
of the Companies Act 1993. They also found that the percentage of shares held by
stockholders with 5% or more of outstanding equity was around 54% in both years. Inside
ownership (the percentage of shares beneficially and nonbeneficially owned by top
managers and directors) decreased from 37.8% in 1994 to 20.4% in 1997.
120. Stephen F. Cahan & Brett R. Wilkinson, Board Composition and Regulatory
Change: Evidence from the Enactment of New Companies Legislation in New Zealand, 28
FIN. MGMT. 32 (1999).
121. M. Hossain et al., The Investment Opportunity Set and the Voluntary Use of
Outside Directors: New Zealand Evidence, 30 AcCT. & Bus. RES. 263 (2000).
122. Id.
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Chairman of the Board.123 Holding both positions is known as CEO duality. The
Listing Rules do not preclude an executive who is not the CEO from being a
chairman. By international standards, NZSX companies have low levels of CEO
duality and of having executive chairpersons.
A study of 184 New Zealand listed companies in 1984 found that 11.14%
had a CEO who was also board chair.124 This was down somewhat from the 1980
figure of 17.83%.125 Independent board chairs have become more commonplace
in recent years, with the incidence of these increasing from 62% in 2005 to 72% in
2009. 126
Arguments in favor of CEO duality propose it leads to increased
organizational effectiveness and is reflected in improved company performance.127
In this regard, CEO duality is seen to result in a situation where there is one clear
leader, with no doubt as to who has authority or responsibility over company
matters.
Compelling arguments have also been made against CEO duality. CEO
duality may lead to a situation where the governance role of boards is
compromised. When a chairman is also the CEO, the resultant concentration of
power makes it more difficult for the board as a whole to effectively evaluate the
performance of the CEO and of other executives. Hirsch and Watson go so far as
to propose a link between CEO duality and corruption:
As the chairman has significant influence within the board, he or
she can impair the board's decisions and the way in which the
board monitors management's conduct. Such an increase in
influence without any superior or balancing level of effective
control can induce an exploitation of that position, which can
lead to corruption. Additionally, performing two functions with
partially opposed duties raises a conflict of interests, which can
foster poor corporate governance.128
If we adopt an agency theory perspective, separating the roles of CEO
and chairman may reduce the ability of the CEO and executives in general to
123. NZSX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code, r. 2.1, [hereinafter NZSX Best
Practice Code] available at https://www.nzx.com/files/static/NZSXNZDXListingRule
Appendices.pdf.
124. Turner, supra note 87.
125. Fox, supra note 87.
126. Fox & Walker, Board Composition and New Zealand Stockmarket Companies,
supra note 87; Fox, Walker & Pekmezovic, supra note 35.
127. These positive views of CEO duality tend to be consistent with what is known as
stewardship theory. See James H. Davis et al., Toward a Stewardship Theory of
Management, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 20 (1997); Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis,
Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns, 16
AusTL. J. MGMT. 49 (1991).
128. Watson & Hirsch, supra note 54, at 61-62.
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engage in self-serving behavior. The roles of the chairman and CEO can be seen
as encompassing different domains that may not be complementary, particularly if
one of the roles of the chair is as a mentor and reality check for the CEO, and as a
focal point for providing information to the board as a whole.
Despite concerns about CEO duality, a review of sixty-nine studies from
around the world provides no support for a link between board leadership and
financial performance, either positive or negative.129 Equivocal research findings
are also found in New Zealand. Mark A. Fox and Peter Cammock examined the
impact of CEO duality (and of having executive chairpersons) for New Zealand
listed companies in 1990 on financial performance (averaged for 1990 to 1993).
They found no evidence of an impact of board leadership on financial
performance.130 Also, Prevost, Rao, and Hossain found that CEO duality did not
explain board performance. 131  Finally, a study of corporate failure in New
Zealand listed companies from 1985 to 1990 found no relationship between CEO
duality and the propensity that firms will fail.
Given the lack of consistent findings on CEO duality, it may well be the
case that "researchers investigating corporate governance [should] recognize that
CEOs and boards do not always have different interests. Such research should
consider the circumstances in which board vigilance, firm performance, and
informal CEO power interact and the role these factors play in the governance
equation."l32
These views are consistent with the idea of strategic governance reform,
that the best governance practices are situational and depend on the nature of
firms themselves and the environments in which they operate.133
D. Diversity on Boards
While efforts to improve the diversity of boards in general have gained
increasing global attention, the representation of women is usually the primary
129. Dalton et al., supra note 109.
130. Mark A. Fox & Peter C. Cammock, Leadership of Boards of Directors and
Financial Performance in New Zealand, 1990-93, 18 N.Z. J. Bus. 143 (1996).
131. Hossain et al., supra note 59.
132. Sydney Finkelstein & Richard A. D'Aveni, CEO Duality as a Double-Edged
Sword: How Boards of Directors Balance Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of
Command, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1079, 1103 (1994).
133. For a recent study that also formulates a model that considers both financial and
nonfinancial aspects of director performance, see Deryl Northcott & Janine Smith,
Managing Performance at the Top: A Balanced Scorecard for Boards of Directors, 7 J.
ACCT. & ORG. CHANGE 33 (2011). See also James C. Lockhart, Revisiting the Black Box:
Reflections on Governance Activities, Governance Research and the Prescription for Best
Practice (Massey Univ. Coll. of Bus., Research Paper No. 18, Oct. 1, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1686035.
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focus.' 34 This is largely because the paucity of women on boards is one of the
more obvious shortcomings in terms of board diversity. A Korn/Ferry Institute
report shows that women directors are more commonplace in large U.S.
companies, with 85% of Fortune 1000 companies having at least one female
director.'35 In Australia, the proportion of female directors of Top 200 companies
is now at 9.8%. 136 This percentage is similar to Britain, where women make up
7.8% of the members of the boards of FTSE 250 companies, and 12.5% of the
board members of FTSE 100 companies.' 37 In the United States, however, it is
thought that about 15% of all directors are women.' 38 Kom/Ferry reports that
Sweden and Norway are the only countries to have made real progress in
women's representation on boards.' 39 In New Zealand, the Chairman of the
former Securities Commission, Jane Diplock, noted the "dismal progress for
women in reaching the boardrooms of New Zealand listed companies." 4 0
Research findings support these assertions. A New Zealand study looked
at diversity of fifty-nine listed company boards from 1997 to 2001.141 Over this
period, the number of women directors rose from 4.1% to 5.7%.142 More recently,
134. Van der Walt and Ingley create a taxonomy of diversity and note that this
construct can include factors such as age, gender, ethnicity, discipline, independence,
culture, industry background, and religion. See Nicholas van der Walt & Coral Ingley,
Board Dynamics and the Influence of Professional Background, Gender and Ethnic
Diversity ofDirectors, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 218 (2003). Another study by van der Walt
et al., Board Configuration, supra note 27, mentions board diversity, including board size,
independence, number of directorships per director, and relative experience.
135. KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 2007, at 6,
available at http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/files/pdfl/BoardStudyO7_LoRez
FINAL.pdf.
136. Kate Lahey, Women Make Inroads in the Boardroom, AGE (Melbourne), Aug.
11, 2010, Business 5. See also Peter Wilson, Gender Equity: Don't Be Left Behind,
WEEKEND FIN. REV., Jan. 22-23, 2011, 62; Glenda Korporaal, Time Is Short for Firms to
Lift Equality for Women, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 26-27, 2011, at 28.
137. E. MERVYN DAVIES ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARDS 7 (2011), available at
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/w/I 1-745-women-on-boards.pdf.;
see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WOMEN IN ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU:
PROGRESS REPORT 9-12 (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/women-on-boards en.pdf.
138. KORN/FERRY INSTITUTE, supra note 135.
139. Id.
140. Jane Diplock, Chairman, New Zealand Securities Commission, Address at the
Wellington Branch of the Institute of Directors (Apr. 6, 2006).
141. Van der Walt et al., Board Configuration, supra note 27.
142. Id. The numerical increase was from 16 out of 395 (for 1997) to 23 out of 404
(for 2001). Based on a composite measure of diversity that included elements of gender,
ethnicity, age, board size, director independence, and the number of directorships per
director. The findings suggest that "a relatively high level of board diversity is associated
with increased profitability, whereas the converse is true where there is a relatively high
level of strategic complexity." Id. at 142. The authors caution that these findings are not
based on looking at the lagged impact of changes in diversity. Id.
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a 2008 study of women's participation on boards showed that women held only
8.7% of directorships in the Top 100 listed companies, as measured by market
capitalization. 143 In a 2009 survey of 753 listed company directors only fifty-nine
(7.7%) were women.'" Women are also infrequently board chairs, with only six
NZSX companies having female board chairs in 2009.145 However, as mentioned
earlier, women directors tend to have more interlocking directorships with other
companies than their male counterparts. 14 6
Data on women's representation elsewhere in the economy indicates that
women are particularly underrepresented on the boards of listed companies. For
2005, Jacqui Shilton, Judy McGregor, and Marianne Tremaine compared the
representation of women on the boards of fifty-four Crown (i.e., government-
owned) companies and Top 40 listed companies. 147  For Crown companies,
women comprised 19.7% of all directors; 85.2% of these companies had at least
one or more female directors on their boards. In contrast, female directors
comprised only 3.9% of all directors for corporate companies. However, 28.2%
of listed companies had one or more female directors. 148 It has been reported that
women comprised 35% of directors on Crown companies, 17% of top legal
partnerships, and 24% ofjudges. 149
143. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, NEW ZEALAND CENSUS OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION
2008 (2008), available at http://www.hrc.co.nz/hrc-new/hrc/cms/ files/documents/28-Mar-
2008_12-59-39 2008 Census of WomensParticipation.pdf. Also, Judy McGregor
reports on data from 166 of the 200 top companies in New Zealand; 28.3% of these
companies had some female representation on their boards, but women comprised only
4.4% of all directors. That data also indicates that women who did become directors tended
to be middle-aged and highly educated, but one imagines the same could be said of men.
McGregor also discusses the use of a training program designed to enhance skills. See
Judy McGregor, The New Zealand Experiment - Training to Be on Board as a Director, in
WOMEN IN MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 129 (Ronald
J. Burke & Mary C. Mattis eds., 2000).
144. Mark A. Fox, Gordon R. Walker & Alma Pekmezovic, Women Directors on
NZSX Company Boards, 28 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 577 (2010).
145. Id.
146. This issue is also mentioned by van der Walt et al., who note that in their 1997 to
2001 sample, "the same few women directors tended to serve on multiple boards." Van der
Walt et al., Board Configuration, supra note 27, at 142.
147. Jacqui Shilton, Judy McGregor & Marianne Tremaine, Feminizing the
Boardroom: A Study of the Effects of Corporatization on the Number and Status of Women
Directors in New Zealand Companies, 11 WOMEN MGMT. REv. 20 (1996).
148. See id. at 23 (proposing that the greater representation of women on the boards of
Crown companies is partly a reflection of several factors; namely, the public sector being
more responsive to such concerns, the impact of equal opportunity legislation, the "climate
and culture of public sector organizations which has made the representation of women
seem both more urgent and desirable as well as more appropriate," and the proactive role of
the Crown Company Monitoring Unit).
149. See Judy McGregor, Gender Equality Lacking in New Zealand Boardrooms,
SUNDAY STAR TIMES (Auckland) (Mar. 30, 2008), http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/338351.
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In a 2006 speech, Diplock argued that it makes good business sense to
have women directors.5 o Likewise, Judy McGregor, the New Zealand Equal
Employment Opportunities Commissioner, stated that "the lockout of women
from corporate governance is mystifying at a time when corporate social
responsibility and the value of diversity are popular talking points. In other
countries, there is much greater recognition of business benefits of women on
boards."i 5 1
Shilton, McGregor, and Tremaine also note the market power of women
as consumers and their level of investment in companies suggests that
corporations could benefit their competitive position by recruiting women
directors.152 The logic here is that if boards look more like the markets they serve,
they will be more likely to make decisions that better serve the customers that
their businesses serve.'53 Some credence for this proposition is found in a study of
Fortune 500 companies by Catalyst, which shows over a four-year period
companies with the highest proportion of women on their boards had significantly
higher profitability than boards having the lowest proportions of women.'5 4 In
New Zealand, a sample of the Top 50 listed companies from 1997 to 2007 also
found gender representation had a positive effect on financial performance.' 55
Also, a New Zealand study of 355 firm year observations for small cap listed
firms from 2001 to 2005 found that female representation on boards has a positive
effect on financial performance. 56
The above research (particularly regarding independent directors, board
size, and CEO duality) indicates that there are no established links between board
characteristics and the financial performance of New Zealand listed companies.
As a consequence, strategic governance reforms based on a "comply or explain"
model that recognize the possible pitfalls of some governance structures, while
allowing for deviations from these, appear to be optimal. In essence, then, the
research findings for New Zealand indicate that optimal governance practices are
situational and depend on the nature of firms themselves and the environments in
which they operate.
150. Diplock, supra note 140.
151. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, EEO COMMISSIONER: WOMEN LOCKED OUT OF
BOARDROOM, (Mar. 30, 2008), available at http://www.hrc.co.nz/2008/eeo-commissioner-
women-locked-out-of-boardroom.
152. Shilton et al., supra note 147.
153. See, e.g., ToM PETERS ONLINE EDITION, http://www.tompeters.com/
dispatches/010021.php (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). For a conceptual discussion on the
benefits of diversity, including gender diversity, see van der Walt & Ingley, supra note 134.
154. Jessica Marquez, Firms with More Women on Boards Perform Better than Those
that Don 't, WORKFORCE, Sept. 30, 2007, http://www.workforce.com/article/20070930/
NEWS01/309309999.
155. Krishna Reddy, The Relationship Between Corporate Governance Practices and
Financial Performance in New Zealand: An Empirical Investigation (2010) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Waikato), available at http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/
handle/10289/4367.
156. Reddy et al., Small Cap Companies, supra note 61.
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V. BOARD COMMITTEES
One historical criticism of corporate governance research is that it has
largely focused on the board of directors as a whole, rather than on the key
committees where (particularly on larger boards) decisions are often made.' 57 The
NZSX Listing Rules focus on the audit, remuneration, and nomination
committees. While audit committees are required, remuneration and nominations
committees are not strictly necessary if a company is constrained by having a
small board.
A. Audit Committees
The Code of Corporate Governance Best Practices Rule 3.1 states that
audit committees should be comprised of only nonexecutive directors.'"8 This
rule is presumably intended to protect the integrity of financial reporting and
ensure that such reporting is not tainted by self-interest on the part of executive
directors. The Best Practice Code goes into further detail about the requirements
of an audit committee. Rule 3.6.1 of the Code requires each issuer to establish an
audit committee that shall be comprised solely of directors of the issuer, have a
minimum of three members, have a majority of members that are independent
directors, and have at least one member with an accounting or financial
background.159  Rule 3.6.3 sets out the responsibilities of an issuer's audit
committee.160 These responsibilities include ensuring that processes are in place,
recommending the appointment and removal of the independent auditor, meeting
regularly to monitor and review the independent and internal auditing practices,
having direct communication with any internal auditors, reviewing financial
reports, advising directors on compliance matters, and ensuring the external
auditor or lead audit partner is changed at least every five years. A member of the
audit committee will be deemed to have adequate accounting or financial
background if he or she is a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
New Zealand, has held a CFO position at an issuer for more than twenty-four
157. Focusing on boards as a whole, without consideration of board committees "may
actually distort perceptions of corporate boards, their functions, and the roles of directors."
See Idalene Kesner, Directors' Characteristics and Committee Membership: An
Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure, and Gender, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66, 66 (1988).
In New Zealand, Chandler and Henshall observe that "[t]he presence of committees is a
definite indication of corporate size, perhaps not so much because of their increased
propensity to deal with complexity, but because large companies tend to have large boards
which by necessity and expedition must delegate to committees." Chandler & Henshall,
supra note 45, at 33.
158. NZSX Best Practice Code, supra note 123, r. 3.1.
159. Id. r. 3.6.1.
160. Id. r. 3.6.3.
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months, has completed a NZX course for Audit Committee members, has
experience and/or qualifications deemed satisfactory by the board.'61
The prevalence of audit committees in New Zealand listed firms has
grown markedly over the last thirty years. In 1982, only around 15% of listed
companies had audit committees. 162 Michael E. Bradbury looked at the choice to
voluntarily establish audit committees.' Of 135 New Zealand firms listed in
1981, only twenty had an audit committee (at this time listed companies could
choose whether or not to have an audit committee). Bradbury observed that the
formation of audit committees was not related to agency concerns arising from the
separation of ownership and control.164  However, a relationship was found
between each of board size and intercorporate ownership (another company
owning at least 10% of the shareholding) and the voluntary formation of audit
committees.165  Bradbury proposed that larger boards might form audit
committees as an efficient means of reviewing audited financial statements and
implementing accounting controls.'66 This may be because larger boards typically
comprise more independent directors than smaller boards, and independent
directors may be concerned with documenting that they are showing "due care."
Bradbury also observed the low rate of voluntary audit committee formation may
have been due to low litigation rates, together with a lack of contingency-based
legal fees and class action privileges.167
Subsequently, by 1989 around 22% of listed companies had audit
committees.168  Audit committees became more common following the 1987
sharemarket crash, and the 1989 requirement that CEOs and CFOs "of most
public sector entities to acknowledge, in the financial statements, their
responsibility for those statements and for maintaining an effective system of
internal control."' 69 By 1993, 63% of listed companies had audit committees,
161. NZSX LISTING RULES, supra note 24, r. 3.6.3.
162. Richard F. Chandler, The Audit Committee: Awaiting Discovery in New Zealand,
61 ACCT. J. 201 (1982).
163. Michael E. Bradbury, The Incentives for Voluntary Audit Committee Formation,
9 J. AcCT. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (1990).
164. Id. at 32.
165. Id. at 33.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 34.
168. M. Lukkassen, An Investigation into the Use of, and Attitudes to, Audit
Committees by Chief Accountants of New Zealand Listed Public Companies (1989)
(unpublished research report, Dep't of Accountancy, Massey Univ.) (on file with authors).
169. Brenda A. Porter & Philip J. Gendall, Audit Committees in Private and Public
Sector Corporates in New Zealand: An Empirical Investigation, 2 INT'L J. AUDITING 49, 50
(1998). For a discussion of the responsibility of auditors to nonclients for negligence in
New Zealand (contrasted with several other common law countries, Canada, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia), see Carl Pacini et al., At the Interface of Law
and Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction in the Scope of Auditor
Liability to Third Parties in Common Law Countries, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 171 (2000); see also
Janne Chunga et al., Auditor Liability to Third Parties After Sarbanes-Oxley: An
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compared with 58% of private companies, with two-thirds of audit committees
having been established in the prior four years.1 70  The major reasons for
establishing audit committees were as good practice in general, and to facilitate
examining internal controls and the effective examination of external financial
reports.' 7 ' A 1996 survey comprising fifty-six listed companies showed that 77%
had audit committees. 172 By 1996, the typical audit committee met 3.3 times per
year and comprised 3.5 members, 2.9 of whom were nonexecutives.17 3
Several studies provide further insight into the composition of audit
committees. Elizabeth Rainsbury looked at thirty-one large listed companies for
1999, comprising 227 directors.174 Forty-three percent of these directors were
members of audit committees, and 32% were members of remuneration
committees. Nonexecutive directors and those directors with financial expertise
were more likely to be members of audit committees. Audit committee members
were also likely to be on remuneration committees.175  This may be because
financial expertise is useful for serving on both committees.
In a sample of New Zealand listed companies for 2004 and 2005, Vineeta
Sharma, Vic Naiker, and Barry Lee found that the average audit committee
comprised 3.46 members, that 78% of audit committees had an independent chair,
and that 67% had at least one accounting expert.176  They noted that audit
committees met more frequently when managerial ownership was higher, leading
International Comparison of Regulatory and Legal Reforms, 19 J. AccT., AUDITING &
TAX'N 66 (2010); Carl Pacini et al., Auditor Liability to Third Parties: An International
Focus, 15 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 394 (2000); Susan M. Watson, The Application of
'Common Sense' Liability of Auditors in New Zealand, 43 J. Bus. L. 286 (1999); Susan
Watson, Liability ofAuditors to Third Parties in New Zealand, Clarification at Last, 44 J.
Bus. L. 52 (2000).
170. Porter & Gendall, supra note 169.
171. Id.
172. Mark A. Fox & Gordon R. Walker, Corporate Governance and the Company
Secretary, 2(4) CoRP. GOVERNANCE Q. 4 (1996). This rate was notably lower than for
Australian and UK companies. See Mark A. Fox & Gordon R. Walker, Boards of
Directors and Board Committees in New Zealand: International Comparisons, 10 BOND
L.REv. 341 (1998). Mark A. Fox, Board Structure of New Zealand Listed Companies: An
International Comparative Study (Dep't of Econ. & Mktg., Discussion Paper No. 20,
Lincoln Univ., 1996), http://www.researcharchive.lincoln.ac.nz/dspace/bitstream/10182/
958/3/cddp_2O.pdf.
173. Fox & Walker, Corporate Governance, supra note 172.
174. Elizabeth Rainsbury, Audit Committee Membership - A New Zealand
Perspective, 16 PAC. ACCT. REv. 45 (2004).
175. Id Rainsbury suggests that "[t]his may reflect the limited pool of independent
directors available for board committees or the power and influence these directors have on
the board." Id. at 64. Given the prevalence of independent directors on New Zealand listed
companies' boards, we suggest that it is not independence per se that may be the
influencing factor, but directors with financial expertise.
176. Sharma, Vineeta, Vic, Naiker, Barry & Lee, Determinants of Audit Committee
Meeting Frequency: Evidence from a Voluntary Governance System, 23 ACCT. HORIZONS
245 (2009).
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them to propose that "the audit committee may be addressing important agency
problems associated with managerial power vesting through greater
ownership." 77 Firms with greater institutional ownership had audit committees
that tended to meet more frequently. This was seen as a sign that institutional
investors were demanding more effective governance practices. Audit committees
also met less frequently when there were more multiple directorships. Sharma,
Naiker, and Lee went so far as to suggest that regulators consider limiting the
number of directorships held in order to "enhance the quality of financial
oversight by the audit committee."m
As a related matter, various studies have examined the impact of the
Financial Reporting Act 1993. These studies typically focus on the impact of
mandatory disclosure requirements. However, the research findings yield mixed
results. Stephen Owusu-Ansah and Joanna Yeoh contrasted the disclosure
practices of fifty listed companies between the pre- and post-Financial Reporting
Act regimes.179  They found significantly higher disclosure levels after the
Financial Reporting Act was in place. Further, Ahsan Habib and Sidney Weil
looked at thirty-eight companies and 341 firm year observations from 1990 to
1999.80 They found no evidence of any significant impact of the 1993 regulatory
reform on the value-relevance of accounting information.
B. Remuneration Committees
According to the Code of Corporate Governance Best Practices Rule 3.7, issuers
should establish a remuneration committee to recommend compensation packages
for directors to shareholders.' 8' Issuers should identify the members of the
remuneration committee in their Annual Report. The NZSX Code of Best
Practice does not prescribe the composition of remuneration committees. The
Code is silent on the process for determining director remuneration and the
disclosures that should be made in relation to this process. In this regard,
information relating to the performance of directors and efforts to benchmark
compensation may also be useful. Listing Rule 3.5 deals with directors'
remuneration. LR 3.5.1 provides that:
[N]o remuneration shall be paid to a director in his or her
capacity as a director of the issuer or any subsidiary, other than
a subsidiary which is listed (including any remuneration paid to
177. Id. at 260.
178. Id. at 261.
179. Stephen Owusu-Ansah & Joanna Yeoh, The Effect of Legislation on Corporate
Disclosure Practices, 41 ABACUS 92 (2005).
180. Ahsan Habib & Sidney Weil, The Impact of Regulatory Reform on the Value-
Relevance ofAccounting Information: Evidence from New Zealand, 24 ADVANCES IN AcCT.
227 (2008).
181. NZSX Best Practice Code, supra note 123, r. 3.7.
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that director by a subsidiary, other than a subsidiary which is
also listed) unless the remuneration has been authorised by an
Ordinary Resolution of the Issuer.' 82
The resolution must express directors' remunerations as either a monetary sum per
annum payable to all directors of the issuer taken together or a monetary sum per
annum payable to any person who from time to time holds office as the director of
the issuer. Clause 211(1)(f) of the Companies Act 1993 requires full disclosure in
the annual report of the director's remuneration.
Listing Rule 3.5.2 allows an issuer to make a payment to a director or
former director of that issuer by way of a lump sum or pension, upon or in
connection with the retirement or cessation of office of that director, only if the
amount of the payment or the method of calculation of the amount of that payment
is authorized by an ordinary resolution of the issuer.' 8 3 Both the nomination and
remuneration committees should have a written charter that articulates their
authority, duties, responsibilities, and relationships with the board as a whole.
The board as a whole should also regularly review these committees in light of
their charters.
By 1996, the average remuneration committee of New Zealand listed
companies comprised 3.6 members, three of whom were nonexecutive
directors.184 Independent director representation on remuneration committees is
intended to reduce bias that may favor executives in compensation decisions and
better align compensation with firm performance. A study of seventy-three New
Zealand listed firms from 1994 to 1998 found that outside director representation
on boards was not associated with CEO compensation levels or with the adoption
of executive incentive schemes.' 8 5  This is surprising, as one would expect
independent directors to be able to better constrain CEO pay. Another study
found that around one-third of companies appoint their CEOs to compensation
committees.'8 After controlling for variations in firm performance, the annual
pay increments of CEOs serving on compensation committees was four
percentage points less than those CEOs who did not serve on compensation
committees.18 7 At least one study, however, indicates that boards are better able
182. NZSX LISTING RULEs, supra note 24, r. 3.5.1.
183. Id. r. 3.5.2.
184. Fox & Walker, Corporate Governance and the Company Secretary, supra note
172.
185. Fayez A. Elayan et al., Executive Incentive Compensation Schemes and Their
Impact on Corporate Performance: Evidence from New Zealand Since Compensation
Disclosure Requirements Became Effective, 21 STUD. ECON. & FIN. 54 (2003). Outside
directors were 71% for seventy-three companies listed in 1998. On average CEOs held
only 2.15% of outstanding equity.
186. Glenn Boyle & Helen Roberts, CEO Presence on the Compensation Committee:
A Puzzle (July 29, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650826.
187. Id.
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to constrain CEO pay if they are smaller, do not have the CEO as a member, and
are of higher quality generally.' 88
C. Nomination Committees
With regard to overall board composition, the Listing Rules require that
every NZSX company should have formal and transparent methods for the
nomination and appointment of directors. According to Code Rule 3.10, issuers
should establish a nomination committee to recommend director appointments.
At least a majority of the nomination committee should comprise independent
directors. Issuers should identify in annual reports the members of the nomination
committee. These rules are intended to ensure that executive directors do not
exert too much influence on the nominations process for new directors. Widening
Rule 3.10 to state that the chair of the nominations committee should be an
independent director might strengthen this rule.'89
A survey of 157 directors by Ingley and van der Walt found that the
major factors influencing the selection of directors were: the ability to represent
shareholder interests, being well respected in their industry, being well res ected
in the business community, and having recognized strategic capabilities.' 9 The
compliance aspects of directors' roles were rated highest in terms of the standard
of support provided by the board (protecting assets of the firm and representing
shareholder interests). Ingley and van der Walt also provide some indication of
the strengths and weaknesses of outside directors. Respondents were asked to rate
external directors of their companies on thirty-three criteria. The highest ranked
items were: record of attending meetings, understanding of governance issues,
commercial judgement, quality of contributions at board meetings and their value
to the CEO, and access when needed. The lowest ranked items were: the ability to
provide leadership to management, ability to assist with introductions, technical
competence within the industry, the ability to assist in networking, and technical
competence in sales/marketing.
We observed earlier that New Zealand boards are not diverse. In
particular, representation by women directors is very low. This gives rise to a key
issue for nominations committees (or for the board as a whole, if no such
committee is in place); namely, why do women have so little representation on the
boards of New Zealand listed companies? Is it a function of an "old boys'
network" or of women being less qualified than their male counterparts? There
188. Steven F. Cahan et al., Board Structure and Executive Compensation in the
Public Sector: New Zealand Evidence, 21 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT. 437 (2005).
189. NZSX Best Practice Code, supra note 123, r. 3.10.
190. Coral B. Ingley & Nicholas T. van der Walt, The Strategic Board: The Changing
Role of Directors in Developing and Maintaining Corporate Capability, 9 CoRP.
GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REv. 174 (2001); Nicholas van der Walt & Coral Ingley,
Evaluating Board Effectiveness in the Changing Context of Strategic Governance, 1 J.
CHANGE MGMT. 313 (2001).
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seems to be some credence to the old boys' network argument. One study notes
that new directors tend to be recruited through the contacts of existing directors
and executives, and, hence, not all new board members are selected solely on the
basis of their expertise. 19 This may be due to the informal process that is often
followed in recruiting new directors. James Lockhart conducted case study
research into the recruitment practices of executives and directors in ten New
Zealand listed companies. 92 While the selection of executives followed a
structured process, professional directors were typically selected and recruited on
an ad hoc, informal basis: "Rarely was any process followed other than the
Chairman seeking expressions of interest among colleagues and associates and the
selection made on the basis of who may 'fit in best."'"
93
McGregor's research, based on a survey of women serving on Top 200
company boards, indicates that the reason most commonly given for the lack of
women on corporate boards was that "companies did not think that women were
qualified for board service" (given as a reason by 69% of respondents).' 94 Other
concerns expressed by women directors were that companies did not know where
to look for qualified women directors (62%) and were not looking to have more
women on their boards (59%). Following such logic, the more that nomination
committee can conduct a broad, systematic, formalized search for new directors,
the more likely they are to recruit directors who are not just associates of
incumbent directors.' 9 5
If boards themselves do not address issues of diversity, there is the risk
this will be mandated by legislation. For example, one approach to increasing
women's participation on boards is through quota systems. This approach has
been adopted in both Norway and Sweden. Norway requires that 40% of public
company directors be women, and Sweden requires 25%. 196 Critics of such
proposals worry of government interference in business prerogatives and perceive
that there may be an insufficient number of women who are qualified to be
191. TOWARDS EFFECTIVE GOvERNANCE: A NEW ZEALAND-WIDE REVIEW OF
GOVERNANCE 2007, at 6 (2007), available at http://www.directionsgovemance.com/
07DirFinalReport.pdf
192. James Lockhart, What Really Happens Inside the Boardroom and How It May
Shed Light on Corporate Success and Failure, 31 J. GENERAL MGMT. 29 (2006).
193. Id. at 36.
194. McGregor, supra note 143.
195. For a discussion of various initiatives to encourage women directors, including
efforts by the Institute of Directors, see Rosanne Hawarden & Ralph E. Stablein, New
Zealand Women Directors: Many Aspire But Few Succeed, in WOMEN ON CORPORATE
BOARDs OF DIRECTORS: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 57 (Susan Vinicombe et
al. eds., 2008). One initiative to improve the representation of women on boards is that of
the Auckland Chamber of Commerce. However, their focus is mainly on small and
medium-sized enterprises. They view this as a starting point for women to leverage their
experience onto the boards of larger organizations.
196. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 135.
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directors.197 It would appear to be axiomatic that merit should trump diversity.198
At the basic corporate level, quota systems may erode the fundamental right of
shareholders to appoint and remove directors unless that right has been removed
by the constitution. In addition, there is the danger that gender (or other diversity)
targets may breach discrimination laws.199
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding section reviewed extant research on corporate governance
in New Zealand. We now turn to examine the role of corporate governance in
New Zealand in the context of the global financial crisis. We conclude that while
corporate governance of listed companies was good, the same cannot be said for
nonlisted issuers of debt securities. Here, poor corporate governance and
supervisory failures were causal in the failure of nonlisted finance companies.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
considered the role of corporate governance in the recent global financial crisis.2 00
It concluded that "the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to
197. For a discussion of arguments for and against quotas for women on boards, see
Elizabeth Broderick, Getting on Board: Quotas and Gender Equality, Speech at Third
Women on Boards Conference (Apr. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.humanrights.gov.aulabout/media/speeches/sex-discrim/2011/20110429_wome
n boards.html.
198. Concerns about tokenism were raised by Brierley Investments Limited when a
Wellington woman, Joanne Copland, sought to become a director of that company.
Copland was head of the economics department at a major girls college, qualified as an
accountant, and a private company director. The chairman of Brierley informed
shareholders that "the board cannot have sympathy with, and rejects, the concept of
tokenism in board membership in any form, no matter how well intentioned. It would be
quite improper for any board or individual director to seek to represent any one group of
shareholders on the basis of size of shareholding, race or gender." See N. Stride, BIL Chief
Against Woman's Board Bid, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 10, 1994, sec. 3 at 1.
199. See P. Durkin, ASX Gender Targets Raise Legal Danger, AuSTL. FIN. REV., July
5, 2010, at 5. We should note that it appears unlikely that legislation will mandate
representation by women directors for listed companies in New Zealand. "I challenge you
to examine just how actively you encourage board diversity-at the personal day-to-day
level, and through the institute. People like you hold a powerful position as opinion
leaders, and here you have a chance to take the lead. Not just, as I said, because women are
your employees, your investors and your customers, and social justice demands it, but also
because the evidence is that more women on boards is good for business." See Jane
Diplock, Chairman, Securities Commission New Zealand & Executive Committee,
International Organization of Securities Commission, Corporate Governance and You,
Speech to Institute of Directors (Nov. 24, 2010).
200. GRANT KIRKPATRICK, OECD STEERING GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf.
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failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements."20 1 A subsequent
OECD report identified effective implementation of already agreed upon
standards as an "urgent challenge." 202 A third report addressed this point by
noting that:
It is important for jurisdictions to regularly review whether their
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities are
sufficiently resourced, independent and empowered to deal with
corporate governance weaknesses that have become apparent.
This should include an assessment of inter-agency as well as
internal communication and decision making systems. 203
The above line of analysis requires qualification. As Brian Cheffins pointed out, a
"striking aspect of the stock market meltdown of 2008 is that it occurred despite
the strengthening of U.S. corporate governance over the past few decades and a
reorientation toward the promotion of shareholder value." 204 Cheffins found little
evidence of corporate governance problems except for those in the financial
sector. We have reached the same conclusion.
As we have seen, New Zealand ranks well overall in assessments of its
corporate governance. The main corporate governance weakness that emerged in
New Zealand as a result of the global financial crisis concerned nonbank financial
intermediaries (sometimes called nonbank deposit takers or nonbank deposit
taking financial institutions and generally described as finance companies).
Between 2006 and 2010, over fifty New Zealand finance companies went into
liquidation, receivership, or suspended payments. 205 The president of the New
Zealand Institute of Directors was reported as stating that up to $8.5 billion of
investors' money had been lost or frozen.206 One report, in 2008, attributes these
collapses to a range of corporate practices, including borrowing short and lending
207 208long,207 providing high commissions to financial advisers, inadequate risk
201. Id. at 2.
202. OECD STEERING GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: KEY FINDINGS AND MAIN MESSAGES 7 (2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/10/43056196.pdf.
203. OECD STEERING GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CONCLUSIONS AND EMERGING GOOD PRACTICES TO ENHANCE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 6 (2010), available at,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/62/44679170.pdf.
204. Brian Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance "Fail" During the 2008 Stockmarket
Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 Bus. L. 1, 2 (2009). See also N.Y. STOCK ExCH.,
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2010), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/nyse-cgreport_23sep2010
en.pdf (reaching a similar conclusion).
205. COMPANY FAILURES INQUIRY, supra note 13.
206. Weir, supra note 13.
207. Peart, supra note 12, at 75.
208. Id. at 72.
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management,209 having no independent directors, 210 and conducting related party
21121transactions. Later reports point to a similar effect.
Potential problems in the nonbank financial intermediary sector had been
identified as early as July 2005.213 Broadly speaking, two (partly related) sets of
problems were apparent. The first set of identified problems related to unlisted
issuers of debt securities. Here, the suggested remedy was enhanced disclosure
and improvements to trustee arrangements.214 A second, overlapping set of
problems was related to nonbank deposit takers. Here, the identified problems
were more extensive.215 In any event, all of the problems identified by the
Ministry of Economic Development were realized in the financial crisis. To this
extent, the finance company collapses in the financial crisis were preventable and
can be partly attributed to, in the words of the OECD report, "failures and
weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements." 216
Somewhat surprisingly, there is not a great deal of literature on this issue;
however, two reports by the New Zealand Commerce Committee are notable.
First, in August 2009, the Commerce Committee initiated an inquiry into finance
company failures. 217 The final report was released in October 201 1.218 A key
finding of the final report was that poor governance was causal in the collapses.
Second, the 2007-2008 financial review of the Ministry of Economic
Development contained two appendices on finance company failures. 219
Appendix B of the review comprised observations from the Registrar of
Companies on the finance company failures. The Registrar's report noted that the
finance companies were largely mezzanine financiers to the property market. 220 it
209. Id.
210. Id. at 73.
211. Id.
212. See COMPANY FAILURES INQUIRY, supra note 13; STACE, supra note 4; Gladwell
& Leach, supra note 13; Maria Collett-Bevan, A Brand New Regime, N.Z. LAWYER, Oct.
15, 2010, at 14; Wilson et al., supra note 13.
213. MINISTRY OF ECON. DEV., REVIEW OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS AND PROVIDERS -
STAGE ONE: FRAMEWORK, PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR
REFORM - REPORT TO MINISTER OF COMMERCE (2005), available at
http://www.med.govt.nz/business/business-law/pdf-docs-library/past-work-and-older-
topics-pdfs/review-of-financial-products/framework-problem-identification-and-general-
directions-for-reform-report-to-minister-of-commerce-29-july-2005.pdf.
214. Id. para. 24.
215. Id. para. 25 ("Current supervisory arrangements via trust deeds do not provide an
adequate protection to depositors.. . . [B]ecause there are currently no minimum prudential
standards for trust deeds . .. the supervisory practices of trustee corporations vary and do
not anchor to minimum standards. . . .").
216. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 200, at 2.
217. COMPANY FAILURES BRIEFING, supra note 13.
218. COMPANY FAILURES INQUIRY, supra note 13.
219. FINANCIAL REVIEW, supra note 13. This report is reviewed by STACE, supra note
4.
220. Id. at 8. These finance companies were the successors to the contributory
mortgage companies of the 1980s, which collapsed in similar circumstances.
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listed factors and outstanding issues of concern in the finance company collapses.
These included: poor corporate oveTrance,221 treatment of nonperforming loans
(NPLs),222 lending practices,2 repayment issues (characteristics of Ponzi
schemes), the trustee supervisory model,224 auditors (problematic audits by
second-tier accounting firms), disclosure (no continuous disclosure), and
application of Securities Act 1978 (some transactions designed to avoid reach of
the legislation and inadequate regulatory moratoria).
The legislative response to the bulk of these issues was dramatic. First,
the (now repealed) Securities Regulations 1983 were amended by the Securities
Regulations 2009 to provide additional clauses deemed to be included in the trust
deeds of finance companies. 225 The finance companies affected were issuers that
continuously offered debt securities to the public. Later, an additional layer of
regulation was provided by the Securities Trustees and Statutory Supervisors Act
2011. Second, in September 2008, Parliament passed the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand Amendment Act 2008 to address the problems associated with nonbank
deposit takers.226 This was accomplished by introducing Part 5D into the principal
Act. Thus, section 157C(l)(a) of the Reserve Bank Act 1989 now contains a
definition of a "deposit taker" that includes a person who offers debt securities to
the public in New Zealand and carries on the business of borrowing or providing
227financial services and imposes obligations on such persons. Part 5D of the
principal Act will be enhanced when the Non-bank Deposit Takers Bill 2011
comes into force in June 2013. This Bill introduces licensing requirements and
strengthens the Reserve Bank's powers.
The amendments to the Reserve Bank Act 1989 in 2008 addressed the
majority of the problems associated with finance companies. They did not,
however, address the general problem of nonlisted issuers raising funds from the
public. This area required comprehensive reform. Here, the Capital Market
Development Taskforce recommended the creation of a new market regulator-
the Financial Markets Authority-with the ability to monitor all public securities,
221. Examples of perceived poor governance include: CEO/board chair duality, lack
of independent directors, lack of skills, etc.
222. Examples include "roll ups" by way of capitalization of interest of nonperforming
loans and misleading disclosures in relation thereto.
223. Examples include related-party lending and concentration of loan risk at the
speculative end of the property market.
224. That is, performance of trustee companies rated low especially in relation to
breaches of Trust Deeds.
225. See Securities Regulations 2009, SR 2009/230, pt. 5.
226. See, e.g., [2008] 649 NZPD 17963; see also [2008] 649 NZPD 18210. For a
discussion of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act 2008, see STACE, supra
note 4, ch. 30.
227. Deposit takers must now: have a current credit rating, have at least two
independent directors, have and comply with a risk management program, comply with any
regulations on minimum capital requirements, comply with any regulations on capital ratio,
comply with regulations on related party transactions, and comply with regulations on
liquidity requirements. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989.
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whether listed or not, and this body was established on May 1, 2011.228 In any
event, importing key requirements of the NZSX Listing Rules into the Companies
Act 1993 and making them applicable to nonlisted issuers seems desirable. 22
In conclusion, we view the "comply or explain" basis of the NZSX
Listing Rules as supported by New Zealand and international evidence, which
indicates there is no one best approach to corporate governance practices, hence
the need for strategic governance reforms. This proposition gathers strength when
we consider that a key concern of increasingly strict governance regulations is that
they may hinder boards from being more entrepreneurial and, instead, focus their
attention on minimizing risk.230 The notion that boards should play a role that is
primarily supportive of management (particularly as a strategic asset) is supported
by a four-country study of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand. 231  In that study, around 60% of the forty-one directors surveyed
indicated that changes in governance regulations had caused boards to focus more
on preventing downside risk.232 If that finding holds true for New Zealand, the
key variable will be the enforcement policy of the new Financial Markets
Authority (FMA) since it can reasonably be assumed that a strong regulator will
ensure a focus on downside risks such as incarceration.
As a generalization, the predecessor of the FMA (the former Securities
Commission) did not have a good track record on enforcement. One key reason
appears to have been lack of funding. Although the precise details of the funding
of the new FMA have not been announced, some form of industry levy is likely to
be the prime means of funding the new body along with governmental subvention.
228. CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT TASKFORCE, supra note 33. See also Philipp
Maume & Gordon Walker, Capital Markets Matter: A New Era in New Zealand Securities
Regulation, 29 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 184 (2011); Philipp Maume & Gordon Walker,
Goodbye to All That: A New Financial Markets Authority for New Zealand, 29 COMPANY &
SEC. L.J. 239 (2011).
229. "Unlisted issuers are not subjected to a continuous disclosure regime and in most
cases a prospectus is only filed (and renewed) with the Registrar twice a year. Where funds
have been raised from the public, there is a view that some form of continuous disclosure
model should apply to the issuing entity." FINANCIAL REVIEW, supra note 13, app. B.
230. David W. Anderson et al., The Evolution of Corporate Governance: Power
Redistribution Brings Boards to Life, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 780 (2007).
In New Zealand, Ingley and van der Walt propose that "[a] gap exists between international
prescriptive guidelines for best practices in risk management and actual board practices,
processes, and capabilities for effective risk oversight. We conclude from the results that
even though these directors acknowledge the importance of risk management as an issue
for their organizations, they perceive it in a traditional manner as an operational activity
rather than a specific responsibility of the board and are not actively involved in the risk-
management process." Coral Ingley & Nick van der Walt, Risk Management and Board
Effectiveness, 38 INT'L STUD. MGMT. & ORG. 43, 66 (2008).
231. Anderson et al., supra note 230.
232. Id.
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The FMA has announced its enforcement policy.233 It has stated, inter alia, that it
will actively enforce compliance with the new licensing regime for trustees and
statutory supervisors from October 2011.234 There are good reasons to think this
will be the case because of the FMA's prosecution of the finance company cases
arising before the new regime came into effect in October 2011. A mix of
criminal and civil proceedings had been instituted against the directors of seven
finance companies as of October 26, 201 1.235 A further seventeen investigations
were continuing; charges were laid against another eleven companies; and twenty-
four cases had been referred to another regulator, had concluded with another
enforcement option, or had been closed.236
233. See FMA Enforcement Policy, FrN. MARKETS AUTHORITY, http://www.fma.
govt.nz/laws-we-enforce/enforcement/fma-enforcement-policy/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012).
234.Id.
235. See Finance Company Cases Before the Court, FIN. MARKETS AUTHORITY,
http://www.fma.govt.nz/laws-we-enforce/enforcement/prosecutions-and-
proceedings/finance-company-cases-before-the-court/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012).
236. See Status of Investigations into Failed Finance Companies (Non-Bank Deposit
Takers), FIN. MARKETs AUTHORITY, http://www.fma.govt.nz/laws-we-enforce/
enforcement/prosecutions-and-proceedings (last visited Sept. 2, 2012).
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CARBON TAXES AND THE WTO: A CARBON CHARGE WITHOUT
TRADE CONCERNS?
Keith Kendall
I. INTRODUCTION
Anthropogenic climate change is a rare example of a truly global
problem. While pollution may be seen to have had transnational effects, these
problems could be limited to neighboring states or countries in the same region
(such as in the case of pollution in rivers that cross national boundaries). Climate
change, by contrast, represents a situation in which the actions of a country in,
say, northern Europe, may have an eventual effect on communities in the Pacific
Ocean or South America.
In considering the appropriate means to address climate change, specific
responses can be grouped into three broad categories: taxes (often described as
carbon taxes),' emissions trading schemes (ETS), 2 and command-and-control (or
direct regulation).
Notwithstanding the variety of policy responses available, very little
serious discussion of the relative merits has occurred, especially in the legal
literature. This may be partly explained by the seemingly unanimous global
support for an ETS as the preferred policy among nations seeking to address
climate change in recent years (at least through a market mechanism). 4 However,
the stalling of the ETS in the United States and the lack of concrete outcomes
* Senior Lecturer, School of Law, La Trobe University. Email:
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1. See, e.g., Keith Kendall, Exports and Imports under a Carbon Tar in 7 CRITICAL
ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
477 (Lin-Heng Lye et al. eds., 2009).
2. Also often referred to as cap-and-trade schemes; see, e.g., Janet E. Milne, Carbon
Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade: The Relative Burdens and Risks of Market-Based
Administration in 7 CRITICAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 445.
3. For an overview of these three broad categories, see EBAN S. GOODSTEIN,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (6th ed. 2011), particularly chapters 16 and 17.
4. As of September 2012, the European Union and New Zealand had introduced
emissions trading schemes (via Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L. 275) 32 (EC) and
the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Act 2008 (N.Z.)). The Australian
Government has also implemented a price on emissions effective from July 1, 2012, which
will convert to a full ETS in 2015 (Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) and related legislation). A
proposal for an ETS in the United States passed the House of Representatives but not the
Senate. See American Clean Energy and Security Act 2009, H.R. 2454, 11Ith Cong.
(2009).
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from the Copenhagen, Cancun,6 and Durban Climate Change Summits
demonstrate that any such unanimity is illusory at best.8
This paper seeks to address some of the gaps in the legal literature
dealing with climate change policy alternatives. The overall premise presented is
that a carbon tax is the economic instrument that can be designed most readily in
conformity with international trade obligations imposed under the World Trade
Organization (WTO), so most of the broad discussion focuses on carbon tax. The
economic principles described, however, are common to most alternatives,
particularly an ETS. Only some of the specific elements of these alternatives
require a different frame of discussion.
Section II provides a basic overview of the economics involved with a
carbon tax, written for an audience with no training in economics. Such
information is readily available in economics literature, although the material
tends to be presented in a manner consistent with the assumption that the reader
has had formal economics training. Section III then discusses the main policy
responses to climate change, including those already identified (a carbon tax, an
ETS, and command-and-control policies). This discussion addresses a
shortcoming in the legal literature; specifically, the literature often assumes the
reader is aware of the various policy alternatives and their functions. Some
advantages and disadvantages of the relevant policies are canvassed, with the
conclusion that a carbon tax is the preferable alternative.
One of the primary concerns surrounding any new charge by a domestic
political policy is the loss of international competitiveness that domestic industry
is likely to suffer. Such unilateral imposition of a charge (which will occur under
both a carbon tax and an ETS) results in domestic producers facing additional
costs not also borne by their foreign competitors.9 This loss of competitiveness
can be addressed through a border tax adjustment (BTA) similar to that operating
under most goods and services/value added tax systems around the world. Under
this mechanism, exports have the tax rebated, so they enter the world market free
of the carbon charge, with imports being subjected to the same impost as
domestically produced goods. In this way, the domestic policy has a neutral effect
on a domestic industry's international competitiveness.
Section IV provides a brief overview of the mechanics of a BTA.
Section V deals with the legitimacy of such a mechanism as assessed under the
WTO requirements. This section also forms the primary thrust of this paper, with
5. 2009 U.N. Climate Change Conference (Dec. 7-18, 2009).
6. 2010 U.N. Climate Change Conference (Nov. 29-Dec.10, 2010).
7. 2011 U.N. Climate Change Conference (Nov. 28-Dec. 9, 2011).
8. In addition, Congress debated two bills for a carbon tax as well as a separate bill
for an ETS in the 110th Congress, demonstrating that support exists in the United States for
models other than that presented to the Senate. See Milne, supra note 2, at 446.
9. Jan McDonald, Environmental Taxes and International Competitiveness: Do
WTO Border Adjustment Rules Constrain Policy Choices?, in 2 CRITICAL ISSUES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 273, 273
(Hope Ashiabor et al. eds., 2005).
